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COMMENTS
THE REGULATION OF RENTAL
APARTMENT CONVERSIONS
I. Introduction
Cities across the United States are experiencing a rapid growth
in the conversion of rental apartments to condominium or coopera-
tive ownership.' A conversion is the sale of individual units in an
apartment building by its owner to tenants or outside purchasers.
About 50,000 rental apartments were converted in the United
States in 1977, 100,000 in 1978 and 130,000 in 1979.2 Two major
reasons exist for the increasing number of decisions by landlords to
convert their rental apartment buildings. The first reason is that
operating costs have increased more rapidly than rent revenues,
thereby making it increasingly difficult to obtain an adequate re-
turn on an investment in the building.3 These operating costs in-
clude real estate taxes, 4 mortgage debt charges, and utility and
maintenance costs.5 In some areas, especially New York City and
1. Harris, Moving In on the Condominium Boom, MONEY, June, 1979, at 75. Condomin-
ium means "'[individual ownership in a fee simple of a one-family unit in a multi-family
structure coupled with ownership of an undivided interest in the land and in all other parts
of the structure held in common with all of the other owners of one-family units.'" R. Pow-
ELL, THE LAW OF REAL PRoPERTY § 633.1 [2] n.2 (P. Rohan ed. 1979) (quoting RAMSEY, CON-
DOMINIUM: THE NEW LOOK IN Co-ops 3 (1961)). A cooperative owner owns shares in a coopera-
tive corporation that owns the building and has a proprietary lease entitling him to occupy a
particular apartment the value of which corresponds to his shares. 11 N.Y. JUR. Cooperative
Associations and Corporations and Condominiums § 122 (1971). For a detailed summary of
the procedure involved in purchasing a cooperative apartment, see N.Y.L.J., Nov. 28, 1979,
at 6, col. 1. It is not necessary for the purposes of this Comment to distinguish between
condominium and cooperative forms of ownership.
2. Wall St. J., June 25, 1979, at 1, col. 1.
3. Rose, First, the Buffalo; Then, Rental Housing, N.Y. Times, May 21, 1979, at 19, col.
2.
4. In a typical Washington, D.C. apartment building, for example, real estate taxes in-
creased 40 percent from 1974 to 1978, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, May 8, 1978, at 98.
5. Water and sewer bills for the same apartment building referred to in note 4 supra,
tripled from 1974 through 1978; bills for gas and electricity rose 25 percent in that same
period. Id. The most volatile expense in recent years has been fuel. One New York City
landlord experienced a "four fold surge in fuel costs" in 1974 and fears he will face similar
increases. Another owner reported that fuel costs had risen to 45 percent of the rental income
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Washington, D.C., rent controls have exacerbated this problem by
limiting the landlord's ability to raise rents to keep up with these
costs.' The result is that landlords have begun to cut back on
maintenance, to stop paying taxes7 and to look for purchasers for
their buildings.' Landlords argue that a second reason for the in-
crease in conversions is that the Tax Reform Act of 1969 has made
ownership of rental property less profitable by reducing the deduc-
tion allowed for depreciation on such property.' The Act reduced
the maximum depreciation allowable on used residential rental
property from 150% declining balance rate to 125% declining bal-
ance rate."° Use of the 200% declining balance rate and the sum-of-
in one 50-unit building. "Fuel costs, housing experts say, should never exceed around 20
percent of the rents." Rental Housing Facing Serious Financial Problems Again, N.Y.
Times, Oct. 19, 1979, at A21, col. 4 [hereinafter cited as Rental Housing]. This argument is
without merit, as some landlords are permitted to pass along fuel costs to tenants as they are
in New York City. N.Y. Times, Feb. 21, 1980, at B3, col. 6; id. Feb. 12, 1980, at B3, col. 1;
id. Dec. 19, 1979, at B24, col. 1.
6. I UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, CONDOMINIUM/Co-
OPERATIVE STUDY 11 (1975) [hereinafter cited as HUD STUDY]. New York has two laws which
control the amounts by which landlords can raise rents: The Rent Control Law, NEW YORK,
N.Y. ADMIN. CODE §§ Y51-1.0 to -18.0 (1975 & Supp. 1979), and The Rent Stabilization Law.
Id. §§ YY51-1.0 to -8.0. Buildings built on or before Feb. 1, 1947 are subject to the Rent
Control Law. Buildings built subsequent to this date are subject to the Rent Stabilization
Law. All apartments in rent controlled buildings which became vacant after June 31, 1971 or
became decontrolled because of high rentals or other reasons become subject to rent stabili-
zation. Thus, almost every building built on or before Feb. 1, 1947 is subject to both the rent
control and rent stabilization laws. Lehner & Sweet, Goodman-Dearie Expiration Leaves
Coop Conversions Radically Altered, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 16, 1977, at 34, col. 6 [hereinafter cited
as Lehner & Sweet]. Rent increases are limited to 71/% per year for rent controlled apart-
ments. NEW YORK, N.Y. ADMIN. Code. § Y51-5.0(a)(5)(Supp. 1979). The Rent Guidelines
Board establishes a scale of legal rent increases for buildings covered by the Rent Stabiliza-
tion Law. For renewal leases taking effect between July 1, 1979 and June 30, 1980 the rates
are: 8.5% for a one-year renewal; 12% for a two-year renewal; 15% for a three-year renewal.
New tenants must pay an additional 5% over the renewal rate for the initial lease. N.Y.
Times, Oct. 14, 1979, § 8, at 7, col. 2.
Landlords have difficulty raising rents even in areas where rent controls do not exist. For
example, in Philadelphia, where there are no rent controls,. one landlord stated that fuel
costs in the past five years had increased 200% to 300% but he could not raise rents more
than 10% without contending with complaints from tenants' associations. Philadelphia In-
quirer, Sept. 24, 1979, at 6B, col. 2. See notes 47-58 infra and accompanying text for a dis-
cussion of Chicago where there are no rent controls but conversions prevail.
7. Close to 550,000 apartments in New York City are in arrears on their taxes for three
full quarters. New York City already owns through foreclosure 11,000 buildings, 4,000 of
which are occupied. Rental Housing, supra note 5, at A21, cols. 2-3.
8. II HUD STUDY, supra note 6, at C-18.
9. Id. at C-3.
10. I.R.C. § 167(J)(5). The Code defines residential rental property as structures in
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the-years digits methods of accelerated depreciation is restricted to
new residential rental property."
These economic hazards of apartment ownership have created an
extremely profitable alternative for landlords in conversions. 2
Whether the building owner sells wholesale," or retail," the return
on the sale of an apartment building has proved to be great.'5 In
which at least 80% of the income is derived from residential units. Id. § 167 (2)(B). Used
residential property is that which is acquired after July 24, 1969, has a remaining useful life
of 20 years or more and the original use of which did not commence with the taxpayer. Id. §
167(5).
11. Id. § 167(J)(2). The use of new residential rental property commences with the tax-
payer. Id.
12. Converters with proven track records made anywhere from 6% to 500% on conver-
sions in the Chicago area. Tamarkin, Condomania in Chicago, FoRBEs, Nov. 13, 1978, at 59.
13. A wholesale sale is a sale of the building by the landlord to a developer. The devel-
oper will convert the building after a short time. Berman, Why Co-op or Condo?, in How To
Do A Co-op, CONDO OR AN ApARTMENT PROJECT CONVERSION, N.Y.L.J. Seminars Press, 1979,
at 5 [hereinafter cited as Berman].
14. A retail sale is a sale by the landlord or a developer of the individual apartments
either to the tenants of the building or to outside purchasers. Id.
15. The developer, who buys the building expecting to convert it at a later time, is often
willing to pay the landlord a premium for the building because of the future profits which
can be made from the conversion. Id. The landlord is usually able to sell his building to a
converter for about 30% more than its value as a rental building. Philadelphia Inquirer,
Sept. 24, 1979, at 4A, col. 2.
The [developer], by paying a higher price, has an [added] risk that the long-term
[owner] does not have. The long-term owner, if he fails to do his conversion, can al-
ways sell the [building] . . . at wholesale. The [developer], on the other hand, will
have probably paid too high a price to dispose of the property at his original cost, -if
[the conversion fails].
Berman, supra note 13, at 7. A retail sale yields even a higher return on the building than a
wholesale sale because the combined selling prices of the individual units are far greater
than the selling price of the building as a whole. H HUD STUDY, supra note 6, at C-19. The
following example compares the retail value of an apartment building containing 300 units
with its investment value.
300 apartments; 1,300 rooms:
Income $1,250,000
Expenses 1,100,000
Cash Flow $
Value as an Equity Sale:
Sell to yield 10% = $1,500,000
Sell to yield 8% = 1,875,000
Value as Cooperative or Condominium Conversion:
1,300 rooms at $10,000 a room = $13,000,000
(not including
discounts to
residing tenants).
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addition, a conversion offers the middle to high income tenant an
attractive investment for several reasons. First, tenants who
purchase their apartments in a conversion often receive a substan-
tial discount from the prevailing market price."6 Discounting the
apartment off the market price is a common practice by converters
used to encourage existing tenants to buy. 7 Second, purchasing te-
nants in a conversion may be offered financing assistance by the
converter. 8 Third, like homeowners, condominium and cooperative
owners may deduct mortgage interest and property taxes from fed-
eral income taxes.'" Finally, due to recent increases in the value of
"While the numbers are hypothetical, transactions like these have taken place many times
over the past 10 years." Berman, supra note 13, at 5-6. Benefits from a retail sale are com-
pounded by the recent reduction in capital gains taxes. I.R.C. § 1202. Obviously, these high
returns are only available under current market conditions. Were the demand for coopera-
tives and condominiums to decline or rent controls to be lifted, it might become more profit-
able for landlords to continue operating rental apartment buildings rather than to convert
them.
16. Some Tenants Snap Up Co-ops at Discount Prices, N.Y. Times, Dec. 9, 1979, § 8, at
1, col. 1 [hereinafter cited as Discount Prices]. Real estate specialists in Manhattan suggest
that tenants are paying from 40 to 50 percent of the market value of the apartments. Id. col.
2. In order to raise money for a reserve fund for capital improvements on the building and to
discourage tenants from buying apartments just to make a profit, some buildings impose
penalties on those who resell quickly. For example, in New York City some contracts provide
that tenants who resell within a year of buying must give 10% of their profit to the building;
in the second year, 7.5% and the third year, 5%. Id. at 6, col. 4. A case which illustrates that
tenants are often anxious to purchase their apartments is Borchard Affiliations, Inc. v. Gill,
N.Y.L.J., Jan. 30, 1980, at 10, col. 6 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County). The plaintiff, owner of an
apartment building, moved for a preliminary injunction enjoining the defendants, former
tenants of the building from repossessing their old apartment. The defendants had notified
the plaintiff that they would not renew the lease on the apartment. They moved out, taking
all of their belongings, except for a grand piano. The day after the defendants moved out,
the plaintiff distributed a preliminary conversion plan to the tenants in the building. Having
learned of this, the defendants attempted to reenter the apartment with the hopes of being
eligible to buy the apartment. The court granted the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary
injunction holding that the cooperative plan was only available to tenants in occupancy and
that defendants had vacated the apartment. Id. at 11, col. 1.
17. Discount Prices, supra note 16, at 1, col. 2. Aside from economic motivations, land-
lords offer discounts to comply with statutory requirements that a minimum number of ex-
isting tenants agree to purchase. See notes 251 & 265 infra and accompanying text. In San
Francisco, landlords are compelled to offer discounts. See note 342 infra and accompanying
text.
18. Discount Prices, supra note 16, at 6, col. 3.
19. A tenant-shareholder of a cooperative housing corporation may deduct amounts
which represent his proportionate share of real estate taxes incurred by the corporation on
the building and the land and interest paid by the corporation on any indebtedness incurred
with respect to the acquisition, construction, alteration or maintenance of the building or
APARTMENT CONVERSIONS
cooperatives and condominiums, a purchaser can usually expect to
realize a substantial gain when he decides to sell his apartment.2
The increasing rate of apartment conversions has several effects.
First, home ownership tends to stabilize neighborhoods by giving
the new owners a financial interest in their community." Buildings
are usually substantially renovated either in anticipation of a con-
version or after the conversion by its new owners.n This effect has
been recognized in New York City where a program has been insti-
tuted to convert rental apartments to cooperatives in an effort to
save Brooklyn's Prospect Heights from "creeping urban blight."
Under this program, tenants in that neighborhood are being offered
their apartments at reduced costs and will pay about the same in
monthly maintenance charges as they paid in rent." In addition,
the apartments will be completely modernized.2 This program pro-
vides a viable alternative to the prevailing practice of government
subsidized rental housing. Despite this practice, buildings and
neighborhoods have continued to deteriorate. Now, city planners
land. I.R.C. § 216. A cooperative owner may also deduct interest on the personal loan for his
own apartment. Id. § 163. A condominium owner may deduct interest on a mortgage loan
allocable to the apartment, id., and state and local property taxes assessed on the apart-
ment. Id. § 164. These tax advantages are not available to the apartment renter.
20. See Harris, supra note 1, at 74. The prices of apartments in cooperatives and condo-
miniums in Manhattan rose dramatically in the year ending June 30, 1979. The average
selling price per apartment rose to $150,244, as of June 30, 1979, from $91,459 the previous
year. At $34,000 a room, a two-bedroom apartment with full dining room, which is counted
as a 51/2 room apartment, would sell for $187,000. N.Y. Times, Sept. 23, 1979, § 8, at 1, col.
5.
21. In New York, A Plan to Fight Decay With Co-ops, N.Y. Times, Oct. 13, 1979, § L, at
23, col. 2 [hereinafter cited as Fight Decay With Co-ops].
22. G. LONGHINI & D. LAUBER, CONDOMINIUM CONVERSION REGULATIONS: PROTECTING TE-
NANTS 1-2 (1976) (American Planning Association, PAS Report No. 343) [hereinafter cited as
LONGHINI & LAUBER]. While it is true that substantial renovation of buildings that might
otherwise be abandoned often occurs, those opposed to conversions argue that most improve-
ments are largely cosmetic. Id. at 3. See also N.Y. Times, Nov. 18, 1979, § 1, at 45, col. 2.
23. Fight Decay With Co-ops, supra note 21, at 21, col. 1.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. It has been recognized that urban blight is not corrected by simply building subsi-
dized rental housing. In fact, certain interested parties have recognized the fact and have
called for a more comprehensive approach to community redevelopment. See generally N.Y.
Times, Aug. 15, 1979, at B4, col. 1; Schur, Prescription for the South Bronx, THE NATION,
Jan. 21, 1978, at 38-42; P. BLAKE, OUR HOUSING MESS. . .AND WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOT IT
54 (1974); J. FRIED, HOUSING CRISIS U.S.A. 102 (1971).
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are hoping that the pride resulting from apartment ownership will
help to rescue neighborhoods threatened by decay. 7 Second, recent
studies have shown that a community can reap financial benefits
from conversion. Depending upon the assessment rates in a city,
conversions may result in increases in property tax revenues. 8 In
Boston, for example, the increase in tax revenues resulting from
conversion is reported to range from nine percent to more than 100
percent per building.2 Because most cities assess all multifamily
units at the same rate, whether rental or ownership, the increased
property value resulting from a conversion will usually increase the
tax yield of that property."
27. See generally Fight Decay With Co-ops, supra note 21. See Miller v. Board of Public
Works, 195 Cal. 477, 493, 234 P. 381, 387 (1925) ("With ownership comes stability ....
With ownership of one's home comes recognition of the individual's responsibility for his
share in the safeguarding of the welfare of the community and increased pride in personal
achievement which must come from personal participation in projects looking toward com-
munity betterment.").
28. LONGHINI & LAUBER, supra note 22, at 2.
29. According to an analysis of the Boston situation,
the principal dwellers in condominium units ('young marrieds' and 'empty nesters')
do not place as great demands on city services as do renters (due to the fact that they
have fewer school-age children than the population as a whole, and are usually not on
public assistance programs), this increase in tax revenue does not entail a concomi-
tant increase in municipal costs. For this reason condominium conversions are gener-
ally welcomed [in the Boston area]. The City of Boston in 1973 changed its tax assess-
ment regulations . . . to encourage conversion activity in the city.
II HUD STUDY, supra note 6, § I, at A-36.
30. LONGHINI & LAUBER, supra note 22, at 2-3. A recent New York case that illustrates
the increased value of cooperative buildings and the resulting increase in tax revenue for a
city is River House-Bronxville, Inc. v. Hoffman, 101 Misc. 2d 422, 421 N.Y.S. 2d 161 (Sup.
Ct. Westchester County 1979). In that case, the owner of a cooperative apartment building
sought review of its property tax assessments for the years 1976, 1977 and 1978. The court
heard testimony from two expert appraisers. The first expert utilized an income approach to
value which "is normally utilized by the court to determine the fair market value of invest-
ment type apartment buildings." Id. at 424, 421 N.Y.S.2d at 163. The second expert utilized
a market approach, based upon the sales of various apartments within the subject building
and sales in other similar cooperative apartment buildings in the area. Id. The average unit,
value under the income approach was approximately $31,000 compared with $50,100 to
$108,000 average unit value assessed under the market approach. Id. The court held that the
market approach reflected more accurately the true market value of the property. Id. at 426,
421 N.Y.S.2d at 163. The court noted several factors in reaching this decision. First, the
River House was not income producing property; to adopt an income approach would require
speculation as to what its potential income would be if it were a rental building. Id. at 424,
421 N.Y.S.2d at 163. Second, the use of an income approach to value would not adequately
reflect the value of ownership benefits in the total value of the building. These benefits are
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Despite the obvious advantages conversions afford both to land-
lords and to purchasing tenants, as well as the combined commu-
nity benefits, serious problems have arisen. Foremost among these
problems is the displacement of elderly, low and moderate income
families from their apartments.3 1 Such families are precluded from
purchasing their apartments for a number of reasons.3 2 First, the
reflected in the market approach. Id. Thus, the assessment would be at a higher value and
generate more tax revenue for the city.31. 125 CONG. REc. H7346 (daily ed. Sept. 5, 1979) (floor statement of Rep. Rosenthal).
The displacement rate is the proportion of tenants who do not purchase their converted
apartments. The following table lists the tenant displacement ratio found in several conver-
sion studies:
TABLE 1. FINDINGS OF STUDIES ON THE
EFFECTS OF CONDOMINIUM CONVERSIONS
Proportion of Tenants
Not Purchasing Converted
Units, Displacement RateStudy
Proportion of Displaced
Tenants Who Move Out of
Municipality
HUD Condominium/
Cooperative Study, 1975 75-85% Not given
Palo Alto, California,
Condominium Conversion
Study, 1974 82% Not given
District of Columbia
Housing Market
Analysis, 1976 76% Not given
Condominium Housing: A New
Homeownership Alternative for
Metropolitan Washington,
WASHCOG, 1976 82.3% Not given
Effects of Condominium
Conversions on Tenants,
Tenants Organization
of Evanston, Illinois, 1978 95-99% 55-73%
Condominium Conversions in
the city of Evanston, Illinois,
Evanston Human Relations
Commission, 1978 80-88% Not given
LONGHINI & LAUBER, supra ilote 22, at 2.
32. This point may be illustrated by a formula which has been used by converters in
establishing the sales price and monthly maintenance fees for an apartment. A tenant can
expect to buy an apartment for about 150 times its current monthly rental costs. Philadel-
phia Inquirer, Sept. 25, 1979, at 11-A, col. 3. An apartment which rents for $500 per-month
1980]
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poor often cannot afford the down payment necessary to buy the
apartment. Second, it is difficult for older persons to obtain long-
term mortgages to finance the purchase of their apartments.1
Third, the monthly maintenance charges for a condominium or co-
operative apartment may exceed the monthly rent paid by the ten-
ant.34 The elderly subsisting on fixed incomes and the poor living
on relatively low incomes often cannot meet these increased ex-
penses. Fourth, the elderly may not wish to purchase their apart-
ments because they have been saving for eventual retirement.3 5 Fi-
nally, low and moderate income families generally are not in tax
brackets high enough to benefit from itemized deductions available
to home owners."6 These tenants are therefore forced to look for al-
ternative rental housing as more buildings are converted. The
search for alternative rental housing is made especially difficult be-
cause most of the conversions have occurred in cities where a low
rental vacancy rate already exists. 7 The problem is exacerbated
will sell for $75,000. A down payment on such a condominium or cooperative would be
twenty percent of the purchase price or $15,000 in cash. Id. The apartment owner's monthly
carrying charges, which include a mortgage payment, maintenance fee and property taxes,
will be two or three times the old rent. Id. col. 4. Therefore, a tenant who paid $500 in rent
each month for his apartment could pay from $1,000 to $1,500 per month in carrying charges
for a condominium or cooperative. In the New York City market, however, converters appar-
ently are pricing apartments based on discounts from their fair market value rather than on
rental-based formulas. Discount Prices, supra note 16.
33. I HUD STUDY, supra note 6, at V-6.
34. In 1975, the monthly cost of owning an apartment including mortgage interest, prop-
erty tax payments and maintenance fees went up an average of 30% to 35% over the previous
monthly rent. 125 CONG. REc. H7347 (daily ed. Sept. 5, 1979) (floor statement of Rep. Rosen-
thal). A survey of two buildings in Newton, Massachusetts showed that in one converted
building the monthly cost of ownership was 60% higher than the previous monthly rental
cost before taxes. The deduction of mortgage interest payments and property taxes from
federal income taxes still resulted in a real cost increase of 19% per month. LONGHINI &
LAUBER, supra note 22, at 4. In Evanston, Illinois, the increase in monthly carrying costs of a
converted unit ranged from 60% to 100%. Id. at 2.
35. N.Y. Times, Aug. 6, 1978, § 8, at 6, col. 2.
36. See note 19 supra.
37. Housing experts say that a rental vacancy rate below 5% represents a housing crisis.
Apartment Crunch Alters Manhattan Living, N.Y. Times, Jan. 21, 1980, at Al, col. 1 [here-
inafter cited as Apartment Crunch]. The national apartment vacancy rate in March 1979
was 4.8%, the lowest recorded figure. N.Y. Times, Nov. 18, 1979, § 8, at 8, col. 5. The va-
cancy rate hovers around 1% in New York City, Apartment Crunch, supra, at 1, col. 1, has
been as low as 1% in Washington, D.C., I HUD STUDY, supra note 6, at A-43, and less than
2% in some areas of Chicago. Tamarkin, sdpra note 12, at 55. Conversions, however, have
not been solely responsible for these low vacancies. Also contributing to the depletion of
rental apartments are building abandonments and reduced construction of rental buildings
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with each conversion.
The social effects of displacement are severe. In an area of low
rental vacancies, for example, displaced tenants may be forced to
move out of their old neighborhoods in order to find another apart-
ment. Displaced, older, low and moderate income tenants often
suffer emotional trauma resulting from the move because it is more
difficult for them to see their friends and families, go to church,
and visit their doctors." The move often imposes a great financial
burden. A typical intra-city move costing several hundred dollars
could be devastating to the low income and elderly household.3'
Also, once the displaced tenant finds a new apartment he will
probably have to pay a higher rent.'"
Opponents of conversion argue that the only way to avoid dis-
placement of the elderly and low and middle income tenant is to
stop conversions from occurring. If, however, the ownership status
that results from conversions is viewed as a means of stabilizing
neighborhoods and preventing urban blight, then perhaps conver-
sions should be encouraged. One way to achieve this end, and at
the same time prevent displacement, is to offer financial assistance
to the elderly and low and moderate income tenants so that they
by private developers, N.Y. Times, Nov. 18, 1979, § 8, at 1, col. 2. This reduction in new
construction can be attributed to unavailability of vacant land, LONGINI & LAUBER, supra
note 22, at 1, zoning restrictions, II HUD STUDY, supra note 6, at C-18, rising costs of con-
struction and high interest rates on multi-family construction loans and permanent loans.
Id. Distinct conversion patterns have emerged which show a direct correlation to the New
York City construction cycle. During the first half of the 1960's an average of 24,000 multi-
family units were constructed per year. During the same period conversions.totaled a maxi-
mum of 13 projects, about 1650 units per'year. Then, in the second half of that same decade,
multi-family construction decreased to 5,000 units annually while conversions increased to
an average of 35 projects, or an estimated 4,400 units per year. From 1970-73, new construc-
tion decreased (less than 2000 units per year) and conversions increased to an estimated 65
projects, or 8,125 units per year. 11 HUD STUnY, supra note 6, at C-3.
38. 125 Cong. Rec. H7347 (daily ed. Sept. 5, 1979) (floor statements of Rep. Rosenthal).
It should be noted that the ease with which displaced tenants can find available housing
varies. For example, Washington, D.C., in 1975, was one of the tightest rental markets in the
country, with a rental vacancy rate of 1%. However, most of the displaced tenants had little
difficulty finding alternative apartments. A sampling of 71 displaced tenants in the District
showed that the majority of them found alternative housing quickly, found it near their old
apartments and for nearly the same rent. LONOHINI & LAUBER, supra note 22, at 4.
39. 125 CONG. REc. H7347 (daily ed. Sept. 5, 1979) (floor statement of Rep. Rosen-
thal).
40. Id. According to a survey conducted by the National Council of Senior Citizens, dis-
placed low and moderate income families and the elderly paid at least 20% more in rent for
their new apartments. Id.
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can more easily afford to purchase their apartments." Such assis-
tance could take the form of additional discounts from the con-
verter on the purchase price of the apartment. 2 In addition, gov-
ernment assistance in the form of subsidies for the purchase price,
mortgage payments and maintenance costs could be offered. 3
The third problem caused by conversion is a reduction of private
rental housing in the United States." Those concerned with this
development claim that the traditional mobility exercised by indi-
viduals in this country will be stymied without rental housing. 5
This argument, however, ignores the financial benefits inherent in
home ownership. Moreover, to the extent that a conversion revital-
izes and stabilizes a neighborhood, apartment owners should not
face great difficulty in selling their apartments when they choose to
do so.
Legislative action is necessary to establish protective measures
which meet the interests of both landlord and tenant and furthers
the housing goals of municipalities, which are to maintain an ade-
quate rental housing supply and to stabilize neighborhoods. The
purpose of this Comment is to discuss the social and legal implica-
tions of legislative remedies which have been enacted on both the
local and national levels. Although conversions have become preva-
lent in many cities, this Comment will focus on conversion activity
in four cities, Chicago, Washington, D.C., Philadelphia and New
York. Part HI will examine the use of conversion moratoriums as a
stop-gap measure to provide time for lawmakers to study the
41. See notes 21-26 supra and accompanying text.
42. One Washington, D.C. developer voluntarily offered additional discounts to tenants
over 70 years old who lived in the apartment complex for 30 years or more. Wall St. J., June
4, 1979, at 31, col. 4.
43. This idea was postulated in the EMERGENCY CONDOMINIUM AND COOPERATIVE CONVER-
SION COMMISSION TO THE COUNCIL OF THE DISTrICT OF COLUMBIA, FINAL REPORT (September
1979) [hereinafter cited as D.C. COMMISSION REPORT]. The Commission believed that a maxi-
mum unit price toward which the assistance could be applied had to be limited so that the
assistance was not used to purchase unreasonably expensive units. Id. at 82. See note 348
infra and accompanying text for a discussion of a San Francisco ordinance which requires
such government assistance.
44. This concern led United States Congressman Rosenthal to submit a proposed bill in
Congress calling for, inter alia, a national program to preserve private rental housing in the
United States. H.R. 5175, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. H7349 (daily ed. Sept. 5,
1979).
45. Id. at H7348.
[Vol. VIII:
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problems. Part III will address the constitutional claims made in
recent cases against conversion moratoriums. Part IV will examine
in detail the local ordinances regulating the conversion process in
New York City, Washington, D.C. and several cities in California.
These cities provide examples of comprehensive solutions to the
problems posed by conversions.
II. Conversion Moratoriums
Any solution to the problems caused by conversion must recon-
cile the varied and often conflicting factors discussed above: the
landlord's right to dispose of his property, the tenant's interest in
obtaining equity ownership, the inability of persons in low and
moderate income brackets and the elderly to afford home owner-
ship, and the resulting changes in the affected neighborhoods.
A common response by government officials in several cities has
been the declaration of moratoriums to permit time to study the
problem and develop a comprehensive solution. The moratoriums
enacted generally prohibit the conversion of rental apartment units
to ownership status for a limited period of time."
A. Chicago
Large scale conversions began in Chicago in 1973.11 Thereafter,
the number of rental units declined with a corresponding increase
in the number of units converted.' 8 Legislation was enacted by the
46. Condominium and Cooperative Stabilization Act of 1979, D.C. Act 1-132, 26 D.C.
Reg. 2436 (90 day moratorium which took effect on Nov. 23, 1979); PHILADELPHIA, PA., CODE
§§ 9-1201 to -1208 (1979) (18 month moratorium); Chicago, Ill., Ordinance - Temporary
Moratorium on Condominium Conversion Authorized (Mar. 21, 1979)(40 day moratorium)
[hereinafter cited as Chicago Ordinance]; Fort Lee, N.J., Ordinance 79-30 (Oct. 25, 1979) (8
month moratorium) (declared invalid in Hampshire House Sponsor Corp. v. Borough of Fort
Lee, No. L-11977-79 P.W. (N.J. Super. Ct. Dec. 20, 1979) [hereinafter cited as Fort Lee
Ordinance]; Verona, N.J., Ordinance 15-79 (Aug. 13, 1979) (1 year moratorium) (declared
invalid in Claridge House One, Inc. v. Borough of Verona, No. 79-2765 (D.N.J. Dec. 28,
1979) [hereinafter cited as Verona Ordinance]. See LONGHINI & LAUBER, supra note 22, at 7,
for references to other moratoriums which have been in effect.
47. Tamarkin, supra note 12, at 54.
48. Between 1973 and the end of 1978 the number of rental units in Chicago declined
from 925,000 to 902,000. In the same period the number of single-family dwellings increased
from 290,000 to 335,000. Id. In 1974, 3,100 units were converted in Chicago; in 1978 approxi-
mately 68,000 condominium units were converted in the Chicago area, 43,000 of them in the
city, compared with just 10,000 units in 1976. Id. at 55.
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City Council in 1977 in response to this development." This ordi-
nance did not attempt to limit the number of condominium con-
versions. It required only that developers give tenants 120 days no-
tice of intent to convert.5" During this period, the tenants are
guaranteed the right of first refusal to purchase their apartments.5
This ordinance did nothing to control the displacement of non-
purchasing tenants which resulted from the increase in conver-
sions.5" Following the conversion of one of Chicago's few remaining
rental complexes, the 16-acre, 2,632-unit Sandburg Village on the
North Side,53 the City Council enacted an ordinance entitled
"Temporary Moratorium on Condominium Conversion Author-
ized," which became effective on March 22, 1979.11 This ordinance
imposed a forty day moratorium on any conversion to condomini-
ums which involved thirty apartments or more.
The reasons for the increase in conversions in Chicago during the
last few years are unclear. Rent control, a major impetus behind
the conversion trend in other cities," does not exist in Chicago." In
addition, full tax benefits of apartment building ownership were
available to landlords because many of the buildings which were
converted in Chicago were fairly new and not completely depreci-
ated.57 Therefore, it seems likely that the unusually high invest-
ment return resulting from conversions was the primary impetus
behind the conversion activity in Chicago."
49. CHICAGO, ILL., CODE §§ 100.2-1 to .12 (1977).
50. Id. § 100.2-6 (A). Elderly and infirm tenants are given 180 days notice of intent to
convert. Id. § 100.2-6(B). a
51. Id. § 100.2-6(C). Elderly and infirm tenants are given the right of first refusal for 180
days.
52. See notes 31-40 supra and accompanying text.
53. FoRBs, Apr. 30, 1979, at 16.
54. See Chicago Ordinance, supra note 46.
55. See note 6 supra and accompanying text.
56. Chicago has not had a rental control law since World War H and in recent years
landlords there have been raising rents twice a year, by a total of fifteen to twenty-five
percent in choice buildings. Tamarkin, supra note 12, at 55.
57. See notes 9-11 supra and accompanying text.
58. See notes 12 & 13 supra and accompanying text.
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B. Philadelphia
In response to a sudden increase in conversions5 and the result-
ing complaints by tenants who feared that increased apartment
conversions would leave them without a place to live, 0 the Phila-
delphia City Council enacted a moratorium on September 27,
1979.' This ordinance placed an eighteen month moratorium on
converting apartments to condominiums.2 The purpose of the mor-
atorium is to delay conversions long enough to complete full stud-
ies of the housing needs of Philadelphia and to determine whether
permanent protective legislation is necessary."
In addition to the moratorium, the ordinance contains other pro-
visions that become operative following the moratorium period.
First, tenants must be given a one year written notice of intent to
convert before a conversion may occur.6" This provision successfully
delays condominium conversions for a total of thirty months. Sec-
ond, tenants are granted the exclusive right to purchase their
apartments during the first six months of the one year notice pe-
riod." Third, converters must provide tenants with a specific state-
ment of the total dollar amount due on the settlement date plus
59. In 1977, there were no apartments converted in Philadelphia. In 1978, 500 apart-
ments were converted. Beckman, The City Needs a Moratorium on Condos, Philadelphia
Inquirer, Sept. 25, 1979, at l1-A, col. 1. In the first eight months of 1979, 2,700 units were
converted. Statement of Allen J. Beckman, President of the Council of Tenants Associations
of Southeastern Pennsylvania (COTA), presented to the Rules Committee of the City Coun-
cil of Philadelphia. (Aug. 8, 1979).
60. See notes 37-40 supra and accompanying text. COTA was the group instrumental in
obtaining the moratorium.
61. See PHILADELPHIA, PA., CODE §§ 9-1201 to -1208 (1979). The sale of condominiums is
regulated by the Pennsylvania Unit Property Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, §§ 700.101 to .805
(Purdon 1965). The statute does not regulate the conversion of rental apartments to
condominiums.
62. The law mandates that no conversion plan can be filed with or accepted by the De-
partment of Records or any other agency of the City of Philadelphia for 18 months, PHILA-
DELPHIA PA., CODE § 9-1206(1)(a) (1979), and that, during the same period, no notice of in-
tent to convert can be sent to tenants. Id. § 9-1206(1)(b). The law also gives the Fair
Housing Commission of the City of Philadelphia the duty and authority to seek injunctive
relief to enforce the law. Id. § 9-1206(1)(c).
63. Id. § 9-1206(2). The purpose of the law may have been frustrated by a number of
filings before it was signed. On the day it was learned that the Philadelphia City Council
would pass the 18 month ban, owners of six apartment buildings filed conversion plans.
Philadelphia's Ban on Condominiums Runs Into Problems, Wall St. J., Oct. 2, 1979, at 20,
col. 3.
64. PHILADELPHIA, PA., CODE § 9-1204(1)(a) (1979).
65. Id. § 9-1204(1)(b).
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any initial or special condominium fees."6 Fourth, converters must
provide an itemized list for each apartment of the cost for repairs,
maintenance, taxes and utility payments during the last three
years. 7 Fifth, the Fair Housing Commission is granted the power to
investigate any allegations of unfair conversion practices and to
hold hearings thereon."s To enforce this provision, the Commission
is granted the power to subpoena witnesses and documents." Thus,
the Philadelphia ordinance bars conversions for eighteen months
and thereafter regulates the conversion process.
C. Washington, D.C.
Unlike Chicago and Philadelphia, Washington, D.C. initially
addressed the conversion problem without resorting to a morato-
rium. In 1976 the Condominium Act was enacted by the District of
Columbia Council. 0 Notably, conversions to cooperatives remained
unregulated. Soon thereafter, a moratorium was passed on the con-
version of rental apartments to cooperatives.7 This moratorium
was extended ten times for a period of three years. 2 During this
period, the Rental Housing Act of 1977 was adopted.73 In addition,
the Cooperative Regulation Act was passed as a permanent regula-
tory scheme for the conversion of rental apartments to coopera-
tives. Before the enactment of this Act, however, due to the con-
66. Id. § 9-1204(1)(c).
67. Id. § 9-1204(1)(d).
68. Id. § 9-1203.
69. Id.
70. D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 5-1201 to -1297 (Cum. Supp. V 1978 & Supp. VI 1979).
71. The Emergency Cooperative Conversion Act, D.C. Act 1-90, 22 D.C. Reg. 4379
(1976), and the Second Emergency Cooperative Conversion Moratorium Act of 1976, D.C.
Act 1-112, 22 D.C. Reg. 6447 (1976). The Cooperative Conversion Moratorium Act, D.C. Law
1-71, (codified at D.C. CODE ANN. § 29-801 (Cum. Supp. V 1978)) became law'on June 19,
1976. That law provided for a 180 day moratorium on cooperative conversions which expired
on November 3, 1976. The purpose of this law was to allow the D.C. Council time to develop
permanent legislation governing cooperative conversions. Washington Home Ownership
Council, Inc. v. District of Columbia, C.A. No. 10624-79, slip op. at 4 (D.C. Super. Ct. Oct.
19, 1979).
72. See the legislative history of the moratorium following the text of D.C. CODE ANN. §
29-801 (Cum. Supp. V 1978).
73. D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 45-1681 to -1699.27 (Supp. VI 1979). This Act was amended by
the Council in the Offer to Purchase Act of 1979, D.C. Law 3-26, 26 D.C. Reg. 1823 (1979)
and the Multi-Family Rental Housing Purchase Act of 1979, D. C. Law 3-18, 26 D.C. Reg.
1648 (1979).
74. Cooperative Regulation Act of 1979, D.C. Law 3-19, 26 D.C. Reg. 1649 (eff. Sept. 28,
1979) [hereinafter cited as D.C. Law 3-19].
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tinued increase in conversions,75 the Council passed the Emergency
Condominium and Cooperative Stabilization Act of 197971 that im-
posed a ninety day moratorium on conversion to both cooperatives
and condominiums. This Act also established a commission to
study the subject and to make recommendations for permanent
legislation in this area.77 Upon its expiration, the Act was extended
for two additional ninety day periods.78 Although the Act provided
that no housing accommodation governed by the Rental Housing
Act of 19777' would be eligible to convert under the Condominium
Act of 197680 or under the exemption provisions of the Second or
Third Emergency Cooperative Regulation Act of 1979,"' it did con-
tain limited exceptions. For example, a conversion to either condo-
minium or cooperative status would be permitted where the devel-
oper purchased the housing accommodation in contemplation of
such a conversion before the moratorium was enacted." A conver-
sion could also take place where notice of intent to convert had
been served on the tenants 3 or where the conversion had been
agreed upon by the tenants prior to the effective date of the mora-
torium. 4 Finally, a conversion could be completed by the converter
where a substantial investment in the conversion had been made
75. Approximately three percent of the rental units in the District of Columbia in 1970
were converted between September 30, 1974 and May 18, 1979. D.C. COMMISSION REPORT,
supra note 43, at 29. Because there is no registration of cooperative conversions, there are no
figures available to determine the number of units which have been converted to coopera-
tives. Id. at 26.
76. D.C. Act 3-44, 25 D.C. Reg. 10363 (1979) (eff. May 29, 1979) [hereinafter cited as
D.C. Act 3-441.
77. Id. § 5.
78. D.C. Act 3-95, 26 D.C. Reg. 1014 (1979) (efi. Aug. 27, 1979); D.C. Act 1-132, 26 D.C.
Reg. 2436 (1979) (eff. Nov. 23, 1979).
79. D.C. CODE: ANN. §§ 45-1681 to -1699.27. (Supp. VI 1979).
80. Id. § 5-1281 (Cum. Supp. V 1978).
81. Id. § 29-801. This Act provides:
The Mayor may grant an exemption to the provisions of this act in any case where he
finds that - (a) less than 50% of such units in the multifamily housing accomodation
being converted to a cooperative are occupied; or (b) if more than 50% of such units
are occupied, at least 50% of the lessees of such units have agreed in writing to the
conversion of such housing accomodation to a cooperative. The exemptions provided
for in this section shall be granted only upon application and shall not be granted in
less than ten days after such application is made.
82. D.C. Act 3-44, supra note 76, § 4(a)(1).
83. Id. § 4(a)(2).
84. Id. § 4(a)(3).
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before the moratorium was enacted.85
The Emergency Condominium and Cooperative Stabilization
Act of 1979 was challenged in the Superior Court of the District of
Columbia in The Washington Home Ownership Council, Inc. v.
District of Columbia."' In this case, the plaintiff8 7 sought a declara-
tory judgment that this moratorium was unlawfully enacted and
sought to enjoin enforcement of it." The plaintiff alleged that the
District Council abused its "emergency" legislative power by suc-
cessively enacting the same or similar emergency legislation.89 The
court held that "the successive enactment of substantially the
same substantive provisions of law through the emergency power,
maintaining such provisions in effect for more than ninety days
without .. . [the required] Congressional review is . . .unlaw-
ful.""0 The court enjoined the enforcement of the moratorium and
granted plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment." Notably, the
court expressly stated that only the procedure by which the mora-
torium was enacted was at issue and not the legality or constitu-
tionality of the substantive provisions of the moratorium2 The
85. Id. § 4(a)(4).
86. C.A. No. 10624-79 (D.C. Super. Ct. Oct. 19, 1979).
87. The plaintiff, Washington Home Ownership Council, Inc., is a District of Columbia
not-for-profit corporation, composed of member companies and individuals engaged in own-
ership, brokerage, development and/or management of real estate in the District, including
condominium and cooperative housing. Id. slip op. at 2 n.*.
88. Id. at 3. Plaintiff also challenged other emergency acts which had expired or had
been superseded by "permanent legislation, and thus the court held that injunctive relief
was not available as to them." Id. at 9.
89. Id. at 2. Article 1, section 8, clause 17 of the United States Constitution vests legisla-
tive authority over the District of Columbia in the United States Congress. Pursuant to the
District of Columbia Self-Government and Government Reorganization Act (the "Home
Rule Act") Congress delegated the responsibility of establishing local laws to the District
Council. D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-121 (Supp. VI 1979). Congress may delegate any or all of its
legislative responsibility to the District Council so long as Congress retains the power to
review, alter and revoke the acts of the Council. District of Columbia v. John R. Thompson
Co., 346 U.S. 100 (1953). The delegation of legislative power by Congress to the Council
under the Home Rule Act is subject to certain procedural limitations. D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-
146 (Supp. VI 1979). For example, before "permanent" legislation which is adopted by the
Council can become law it must have passed through two readings of the Council, id. § 1-
146(a), and Congressional review. Id. § 1-147(c)(1). However, the Home Rule Act also per-
mits the Council to enact "emergency" legislation which becomes effective immediately but
for not more than ninety days. Id. § 1-146(a).
90. C.A. No. 10624-79, slip op. at 16.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 2.
1980] APARTMENT CONVERSIONS
Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia stayed the effect of
the injunction. 3 Therefore, the moratorium remains in effect."
D. Proposed Federal Legislation
The rate at which conversions have occurred throughout the
country has prompted interest in national legislation. Concerned
that the conversion of rental apartments to condominiums and co-
operatives is displacing tenants and dangerously depleting the
rental housing supply in this country, United States Congressman
Benjamin S. Rosenthal introduced the Condominium-Cooperative
Moratorium Act of 1979 in the House of Representatives." The bill
calls for a three year nationwide moratorium on conversions and
the establishment of a Presidential Commission on Problems Re-
lating to Condominium and Cooperative Conversions to study the
problem and to make recommendations concerning its solution."
A major problem inherent in federal legislation in this area is
that it cannot accommodate the diversity that exists among cities
in the United States. The supply of and demand for rental apart-
ments varies among cities. A blanket moratorium on conversions
throughout the nation would not take this diversity into account.
For this reason, local legislation may more effectively regulate the
conversion trend. 7
93. District of Columbia v. Washington Home Ownership Council, Inc., No. 79-1053
(D.C. App. Ct. Oct. 22, 1979).
94. There is a possibility that a permanent 180 day moratorium will be forthcoming. The
Condominium and Cooperative Stabilization Act of 1979, D.C. Act 3-143, 27 D.C. Reg. 37,
containing the same provisions as the emergency moratorium challenged in court was sub-
mitted to Congress on January 8, 1980. Congress has 30 days to review this legislation before
it automatically becomes law.
95. H.R. 5175, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. Rac. H7349 (daily ed. Sept. 5, 1979).
Congressman Rosenthal compared the present situation to that which existed during and
immediately following World War If. Id. at H7346.
96. The proposed bill mandates that at least the following groups be represented in the
Commission: 1) consumer organizations; 2) labor unions, especially the construction trades;
3) tenant organizations; 4) builders; and 5) urban planners. H.R. 5175, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.,
§ 201(b)(1)-(5), 125 CONG. REc. H7350 (daily ed. Sept. 5, 1979). It is important to note that
an express provision that landlords be represented has been conspicuously omitted from the
proposed Act. Such an omission is blatantly unfair. Whereas the legislation does not ex-
pressly preclude landlords from participating in the Commission, the exclusion of an express
provision requiring landlords be represented by the Commission disregards their interests.
97. National legislation will invariably entail higher imposition costs than the corre-
sponding benefits achieved by such legislation. See Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Cove-
nants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines as Land Use Controls, 40 U. CH. L. REV. 681, 688-90
(1973).
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The proposed bill attempts to address the problem of displace-
ment in several other ways. First, the proposed bill provides that,
after the expiration of the moratorium period, converters who have
received "federally related loans"'8 must pay up to $400.00 in relo-
cation assistance to displaced persons." Second, it offers federal
tax relief to displaced tenants by permitting low and moderate in-
come households to deduct moving expenses paid or incurred be-
cause of a conversion."' Third, it denies federal housing and devel-
opment grants to any city which permits
the conversion of residential rental units for low-or moderate-income house-
holds to units for higher income persons in condominium or cooperative
projects unless all the persons displaced as a result of such conversion are
assured of obtaining decent, safe and sanitary rental housing with rental
charges similar to those units from which such persons were displaced."'
These additional efforts to ameliorate the problems of dis-
placement are insufficient for several reasons. Presumably, the pur-
pose of relocation assistance is to ease the burden of moving which
would be imposed upon displaced tenants. The amount provided
for moving expenses, however, is minimal and may not provide ad-
equate assistance for tenants in cities where moving costs are quite
high. Furthermore, the relocation assistance is meaningless in areas
where there are no apartments to rent. Also, the $400.00 relocation
assistance required to be paid by converters probably would not
deter them from converting because of the high profits earned from
conversions. Unfortunately, also, the tax deduction provision will
not likely provide sufficient relief for low or moderate income fami-
lies because such families are generally not in tax brackets high
enough to benefit from itemized deductions. The proposed bill's
provision to deny federal housing and development assistance to a
city unless it provides alternative rental housing for non-purchas-
ing tenants is designed to eliminate the problem of displacement
which accompanies conversions. Although this provision forth-
rightly addresses a major cause of the displacement problem, it is
98. For the definition of a "federally related loan" see H.R. 51 75, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., §
105(3), 125 CONG. REc. H7350 (daily ed. Sept. 5, 1979).
99. Id. § 301(b). See note 315 infra for references to other statutes requiring relocation
assistance.
100. H.R. 5175, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., § 402(a), 125 CONG. REc. H7351 (daily ed. Sept. 5,
1979).
101. Id. § 302, 125 CONG. REc. H7350 (daily ed. Sept. 5, 1979).
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unlikely that a city would be able to guarantee such alternative
housing.' 2 The cities would soon look to the federal government for
assistance in providing more rental housing. The cities would be
forced to prohibit conversions if the federal government refused as-
sistance. Landlords, in turn, unable to maintain their rental apart-
ment buildings for the reasons discussed above,'1 would abandon
them. This would result in the deterioration of neighborhoods. A
more enlightened program which recognizes these problems would
permit conversions and grant financial assistance to eligible te-
nants to buy their apartments.'"' The money offered to subsidize
rental housing could be used to subsidize homeownership for the
benefit of all.'05
The proposed Condominium-Cooperative Act of 1979 also at-
tempts to remove some of the incentives building owners have for
conversions by proposing two amendments to the Internal Revenue
Code. The first proposed amendment to the Code would tax the
converter's profits as ordinary income rather than at capital gains
rates.0 6 The second proposed amendment offers an incentive for
landlords to maintain rental apartment buildings by allowing addi-
tional depreciation deductions on such buildings. Presently, the In-
ternal Revenue Code permits depreciation deductions up to $20,000
for the rehabilitation of low income housing.'0 The proposed
amendment would expand this allowance to include all forms of
rental housing and increase the amount that can be deducted to
$50,000.10s To the extent that the present tax structure inhibits
rental ownership,'"' these proposals answer the landlord's grievance
102. The present economic conditions of many cities dictate against the success of such a
program. For a discussion of New York City's fiscal crisis see Symposium: Proposals to
Strengthen New York State Municipal Finance Laws, 8 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1-244 (1979).
Philadelphia is also experiencing financial difficulty. N.Y. Times, Feb. 24, 1980, § 1, at 26,
col. 1; id. Feb. 6, 1980, at A12, col. 1; Wall St. J., Feb. 5, 1980, at 33, col. 2, as is Chicago,
N.Y. Times, Feb. 6, 1980, at A12, col. 6.
103. See notes 3-11 supra and accompanying text.
104. See notes 23-27 supra and accompanying text. But see D.C. COMMISSION REPORT,
supra note 43, app. A, at 13-14.
105. See notes 41-43 supra and accompanying text.
106. H.R. 5175, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., § 401(a), 125 CONG. Rc. H7351 (daily ed. Sept. 5,
1979).
107. I.R.C. § 167(k).
108. H.R. 5175, 96th Cong., lt Sess., § 403(b), 125 CONG. Rzc. H7351 (daily ed. Sept.
5, 1979).
109. See notes 9-11 supra and accompanying text.
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that residential rental buildings are unprofitable to maintain.10
Such amendments are the most effective corrective action which
can be taken by the federal government.
III. Constitutionality of Conversion Moratoriums
Recently, several challenges have been brought by rental apart-
ment owners and tenants to conversion moratorium statutes.
Claims have been made under the United States Constitution"'
and state constitutions."' Those brought under the United States
Constitution allege that moratoriums: are unconstitutionally vague
in violation of the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment,"3 result in a deprivation of property without due process of
law,"' amount to a taking of private property without just compen-
sation,"' violate the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment"' and unconstitutionally impair the right to con-
tract."7 Challenges based on state constitutions allege that the mu-
nicipality lacked the power to enact a conversion moratorium ei-
110. See notes 3-11 supra and accompanying text.
111. Claridge House One, Inc. v. Borough of Verona, No. 79-2765 (D.N.J. Dec. 28, 1979);
Chicago Real Estate Bd., Inc. v. City of Chicago, No. 79 C 1284 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 20, 1979)
(order granting preliminary injunction); Hampshire House Sponsor Corp. v. Borough of Fort
Lee, No. L-11 977-79 P.W. (N.J. Super. Ct. Dec. 20, 1979).
112. Claridge House One, Inc. v. Borough of Verona, No. 79-2765 (D.N.J. Dec. 28, 1979);
Hampshire House Sponsor Corp. v. Borough of Fort Lee, No. L-11977-79 P.W. (N.J. Super.
Ct. Dec. 20, 1979).
113. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; Claridge House One, Inc. v. Borough of Verona, No.
79-2765 (D.N.J. Dec. 28, 1979); Chicago Real Estate Bd., Inc. v. City of Chicago, No. 79 C
1284 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 20, 1979).
114. See note 113 supra.
115. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The fifth amendment is made applicable to the states
through the fourteenth amendment. See Chicago B. & Q.R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226,
239 (1897). Claridge House One, Inc. v. Borough of Verona, No. 79-2765 (D.N.J. Dec. 28,
1979).
116. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Claridge House One, Inc. v. Borough of Verona, No.
79-2765 (D.N.J. Dec. 28, 1979); Chicago Real Estate Bd., Inc. v. City of Chicago, No. 79 C
1284 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 20, 1979).
117. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. See Brief and Appendix on Behalf of Plaintiffs at 1,
Claridge House One, Inc. v. Borough of Verona, No. 79-2765 (D.N.J. Dec. 28, 1979). Except
for a contract to which a state is a party, United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1
(1977), a claim based on impairment of the right to contract receives only a rational review.
Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934). Until United States Trust, it
had been 40 years since the Supreme Court had "seen fit to invalidate purely economic and
social legislation on the strength of the Contract Clause. . . . " 431 U.S. at 60 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). In light of this, challenges to-conversion moratoriums brought under the con-
tract clause will probably fail. The Claridge House court did not address this issue.
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ther because the exclusive jurisdiction to act in this area was
vested in the state legislature"' or because the municipality ex-
ceeded the power vested in it to enact legislation of this kind."'
A. United States Constitutional Claims
1. Vagueness
In two recent cases, Chicago Real Estate Board, Inc. v. City of
Chicago'20 and Claridge House One, Inc. v. Borough of Verona,'. it
was argued that a conversion moratorium was unconstitutionally
vague in violation of the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. In Chicago Real Estate Board, plaintiffs, property
owners, property managers and real estate brokers, first sought a
temporary restraining order'22 and later sought a preliminary in-
junction'23 against the enforcement of the Chicago conversion mora-
torium.2 4 Plaintiffs' argued, inter alia, that the Chicago morato-
rium ordinance that read "[n]o building containing thirty (30) or
more currently occupied dwelling units shall be the subject of a
conversion to condominiums"'25 for a period of forty days was so
vague that a landowner was unable to determine what activity was
prohibited by the ordinance.'26 The plaintiffs contended that the
ordinance violated due process requirements because a violation of
the moratorium ordinance exposed a landowner to a potential fine
or imprisonment.'27 The judge agreed and stated that
118. Claridge House One, Inc. v. Borough of Verona, No. 79-2765 (D.N.J. Dec. 28, 1979);
Hampshire House Sponsor Corp. v. Borough of Fort Lee, No. L-11977-79 P.W. (N.J. Super.
Ct. Dec. 20, 1979).
119. See notes 86-94 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the Washington
Home Ownership case.
120. No. 79 C 1284 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 20, 1979) (order granting preliminary injunction).
121. No. 79-2765 (D.N.J. Dec. 28, 1979).
122. No. 79 C 1284 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 3, 1979) (temporary restraining order).
123. No. 79 C 1284 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 20, 1979) (order granting preliminary injunction).
124. Chicago Ordinance, supra note 46.
125. Id. § 1.
126. The conversion of rental apartments to condominiums usually involves a number of
steps which vary among jurisdictions. These are: the formulation of preliminary plans for
financing the conversion and improving the premises, the sale of the building to a converter
or sponsor, the preparation of a preliminary prospectus, the preparation of legal documents
creating the condominium, the preparation of a sales program, service of notices of intent,
physical improvement of the premises, sales offerings and the actual conveyance of apart-
ments as condominiums. Amended Complaint at 4, Chicago Real Estate Bd., Inc. v. City of
Chicago, No. 79 C 1284 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 20, 1979).
127. Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support of the Motion for a Preliminary Injunction at
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[it is first contended that the ordinance is vague, and I confess that having
studied it, I must agree. We do not know precisely when a person contem-
plating a conversion of a rental unit building to a condominium-type build-
ing would find himself under the authority of this ordinance . . . . [Tihe
ordinance does not make this clear. I don't know how we would know
whether there's been a violation, because it is sufficiently vague that we
would not know [what] activities in regard to advancing existing condomin-
ium projects as may be now going on are or are not a violation of this partic-
ular ordinance.Iu
A preliminary injunction was granted against the ordinance's en-
forcement because, as the court stated, the ordinance was "imper-
missibly vague."'2
The plaintiffs in Claridge House'0 also challenged the constitu-
tionality of a conversion moratorium ordinance on the grounds that
it was impermissibly vague in violation of due process. In that
case, the plaintiffs, a New Jersey Corporation that had acquired a
twelve-story rental apartment building located in Verona, New
Jersey with the intent to convert it to a condominium, and a ten-
ant, who had intended to purchase his apartment, sought declara-
tory and injunctive relief against enforcement of a municipal ordi-
nance that declared a one year moratorium on the conversion of
any rental unit in the Borough of Verona to a condominium.' 3' Vio-
lations of the Verona moratorium were punishable by a fine of not
more than $200 per day or imprisonment for not more than thirty
days, or both.' 3 The building owner argued that converting a rental
building to a condominium involved up to nine different steps and
that the Verona ordinance was so vague that it could not discern
which of those steps could be taken without subjecting itself to
prosecution under the ordinance.' 3 The court in Claridge House
did not rule on the federal constitutional claims presented in the
12, 13, Chicago Real Estate Bd., Inc. v. City of Chicago, No. 79 C 1284 (N.D. Il1. Apr. 20,
1979).
128. Partial Transcript of Proceedings at 5, Chicago Real Estate Bd., Inc. v. City of Chi-
cago, No. 79 C 1284 (N.D. I1. Apr. 3, 1979) (order granting temporary restraining order).
129. Partial Transcript of Proceedings at 6, Chicago Real Estate Bd., Inc. v. City of Chi-
cago, No. 79 C 1284 (N.D. Il1. Apr. 20, 1979) (order granting preliminary injunction).
130. No. 79-2765 (D.N.J. Dec. 28, 1979).
131. "There is hereby declared a moratorium of the conversion of any rental unit in the
Borough of Verona to a condominium. This moratorium shall last for a period of one year,
commencing with the efffective date of this ordinance." Verona Ordinance, supra note 46.
132. Id.
133. No. 79-2765, slip op. at 2 (D.N.J. Dec. 28, 1979).
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case. Rather, it held the ordinance void on the grounds that it was
preempted by state law.' The court noted, however, "that [the]
defendant [had] not offered to define the word [conversion] ....
Therefore, the vagueness argument cannot be dismissed out-of-
hand." 3 '
It is well-settled law that "a statute which either forbids or re-
quires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to
its application violates the first essential of due process of law."' 36
The terms of a penal statute, such as the Chicago and Verona
moratoriums, that create a new offense "must be sufficiently ex-
plicit to inform those who are subject to it what conduct on their
part will render them liable to its penalties."'37 A statute need not
be drawn with "mathematical certainty"' 131 for it to be upheld.
Rather, if the statute uses words or phrases "having a technical or
other special meaning, well enough known to enable those within
their reach to correctly apply them,' ' 3 it will likely be sustained.
Therefore, insofar as there are a number of different steps involved
in the conversion process those which the city government intends
to be prohibited should be precisely delineated. A moratorium ordi-
nance enacted in Fort Lee, New Jersey illustrates the detail neces-
sary to meet the standards set forth above. This ordinance pro-
vided that
[diuring the existence of this moratorium, no sales or contracts for sale can
be entered into, no prospectus issued, and no notice-of intent is to be sent to
tenants and no one can request a tenant to vacate a unit as a consequence of
conversion of a unit to a condominium or cooperative. 10
134. Id. at 9. For a discussion of the preemption doctrine see pt. III (B) infra and accom-
panying text.
135. No. 79-2765, slip op. at 2.
136. Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926) (denying enforcement of
an Oklahoma statute providing that certain employees be paid "not less than the current
rate of per diem wage in the locality where the work is performed" on the grounds that it
was unconstitutionally vague).
137. Id.
138. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 110 (1972) (upholding against a vague-
ness challenge an anti-noise ordinance which provided "[n]o person, while on public or pri-
vate grounds adjacent to any building in which a school or any class thereof is in session,
shall willfully make or assist in the making of any noise or diversion which disturbs or in-
tends to disturb the peace or good order of such school session or class thereof .... .
139. 269 U.S. at 391.
140. Fort Lee Ordinance, supra note 46. This ordinance was struck down on the grounds
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A conversion moratorium drafted in a similarly clear and precise
manner stating the conduct it requires or prohibits should survive a
vagueness challenge.
2. Deprivation of Property Without Due Process of Law
Plaintiffs in both Chicago Real Estate Board"' and Claridge
House' argued that the moratoriums deprived them of valuable
property rights without due process of law in violation of the four-
teenth amendment.' This argument is based on the proposition
that the right to acquire, own, use and sell property is protected by
the fourteenth amendment's guarantee that "[n]o person shall...
be deprived of. . .property, without due process of law."'" Any
infringement of a person's fourteenth amendment rights, however,
must be weighed against a state's legitimate role in protecting the
general health, safety and welfare of its citizens.' Conversion
moratoriums have been enacted pursuant to these police powers.'
that it was preempted by state law in Hampshire House Sponsor Corp. v. Borough of Fort
Lee, No. L-11977-79 P.W. (N.J. Super. Ct. Dec. 20, 1979).
141. No. 79 C 1284 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 20, 1979) (order granting preliminary injunction).
142, No. 79-2765 (D.N.J. Dec. 28, 1979).
143. Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support of the Motion for a Preliminary Injunction at
14, Chicago Real Estate Bd., Inc. v. City of Chicago, No. 79 C 1284 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 20,
1979); Brief and Appendix on Behalf of Plaintiffs at 16, Claridge House One, Inc. v. Borough
of Verona, No. 79-2765 (D.N.J. Dec. 28, 1979). In Hampshire House Sponsor Corp. v. Bor-
ough of Fort Lee, No. L-11977-79 P.W. (N.J. Super. Ct. Dec. 20, 1979), plaintiff, a New
Jersey corporation that had registered a plan for the conversion of a rental apartment build-
ing to condominiums which had not been approved, sought an injunction against the en-
forcement of a conversion moratorium that had been instituted in Fort Lee, New Jersey. The
plaintiff argued that the moratorium which, among other things, applied to any conversion
that had been registered but not approved, amounted to a deprivation of its property in
violation of the due process guarantee contained in article I of the Constitution of the State
of New Jersey. Plaintiffs Brief in Support of Application for Declaratory and Injunctive
Relief at 2, Hampshire House Sponsor Corp. v. Borough of Fort Lee, No. L-11977-79 P.W.
(N.J. Super Ct. Dec. 20, 1979). The court did not rule on these constitutional issues but,
rather, held that the ordinance was void because it was preempted by state law.
144. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1947) (holding
that private agreements to exclude persons of designated race or color from the use or occu-
pancy of residential real estate do not violate the fourteenth amendment).
145. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 262 U.S. 365 (1926) (general zoning ordi-
nance restricting the location of residential and industrial districts held not an invalid exer-
cise of the police power and not violative of due process).
146. See, e.g., Verona Ordinance, supra note 46. "Whereas, the removal of existing units
from the rental housing market would only serve to intensify the emergency, thereby ad-
versely affecting the health, safety and general welfare of the citizens of the Borough of
Verona . .. ."
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Whether these police powers outweigh an individual's right to
freely alienate his property depends upon whether there exists a
rational basis for the conversion moratorium." 7 The plaintiffs in
these cases argued that the conversion moratoriums 'were not a
valid exercise of the police power because they were not rationally
related to legitimate state interests.
The plaintiffs in both Chicago Real Estate Board and Claridge
House based this due process argument 6n three different grounds.
They first argued that a conversion of rental apartments to condo-
miniums represents a change in ownership and not a change in use.
Citing a basic principle of zoning law, plaintiffs claimed that own-
ership is not a legitimate subject of the police power."' Conver-
sions, therefore, could not be prohibited. A case that supports this
argument is Maplewood Village Tenants Association v. Maplewood
Village."' In that case, a tenant's group sought an order requiring
the defendant, an owner of an apartment building who intended to
convert it into a condominium, to obtain subdivision approval
under the local zoning law for his conversion plans. The court de-
nied the request because the change involved one of ownership not
use. 150 The court stated:
The presently existing apartments conform to the township zoning ordi-
nance, and the proposed conversion represents nothing more than a change
in the form of ownership. The use of land will not be affected. Planning
controls, including subdivision approval, cannot be employed by a munici-
pality to exclude condominiums or discriminate against the condominium
form of ownership, for it is use rather than form of ownership that is the
proper concern and focus of zoning and planning regulation."5 '
Another case in support .of this proposition is Bridge Park Co. v.
Borough of Highland Park.152 In that case, plaintiff, owner of an
eleven-unit garden apartment building who wanted to convert the
apartments to condominiums, sought a declaratory judgment and
injunctive relief with respect to a zoning ordinance that defendant
Borough argued prohibited the conversion of garden apartments to
147. See, e.g., Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 661 (1887).
148. 1 RATHKOPF, THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING § 1.04 (4th ed. 1978).
149. 116 N.J. Sup. 372, 282 A.2d 428 (Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1971).
150. Id. at 378, 282 A.2d at 431.
151. Id. at 377, 282 A.2d at 431.
152. 113 N.J. Sup. 219, 273 A.2d 397 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1971).
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multiple ownership."" The court granted the injunction holding
that "the attempted regulation of ownership of property under the
guise of the zoning power is beyond the [police] power of defendant
borough." 15' The Claridge House court agreed with this argument
stating that "condominiums cannot be discriminated against in
zoning or planning because of its form or ownership."''5
The second ground of plaintiffs' inalienability argument was that
the ordinances bore no legitimate relation to the public welfare.
Plaintiffs argued that the city did not view condominiums as inimi-
cal to the general welfare because the construction of new condo-
miniums was not prohibited by the moratoriums. In addition, they
argued that home ownership was positive and valuable to a com-
munity's welfare.156 Such a claim of deprivation of a property right
receives limited review by a court based upon a rational basis
test."7 Under this analysis, a prohibition on conversions is rational.
The purpose of a moratorium is to prevent displacement and to
limit the depletion of the rental housing supply while policy mak-
ers develop a permanent solution. This provides a rational basis
for prohibiting conversions. The construction of new condominiums
would not add to the problems of displacement and rental housing
supply depletion.
The third ground on which plaintiffs' argument was based was
that no true emergency existed which called for the imposition of a
moratorium. Recent rent control cases have undermined this argu-
ment by eliminating the requirement that an emergency must exist
to justify rent control. 55 The constitutionality of residential rent
153. Defendant based this argument on a Borough Zoning Ordinance which defined a
garden apartment as "a building or series of buildings under single ownership." Id. at 221,
273 A.2d at 398. A conversion would entail multiple ownership of the garden apartments and
therefore would violate this ordinance. The court stated "[o]bviously, the definition was for-
mulated intentionally so as to exclude . . . condominiums." Id.
154. Id. at 222, 273 A.2d at 399.
155. No. 79-2765, slip op. at 9.
156. See, e.g., Miller v. Board of Pub. Works of City of Los Angeles, 195 Cal. 477, 234 P.
381 (1925); Zussman v. Rent Control Bd. of Brookline, 367 Mass. 561, 326 N.E.2d 876 (1975).
157. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 661 (1887).
158. Eisen v. Eastman, 421 F.2d 560, 567 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 841 (1970);
Birkenfield v. City of Berkeley, 130 Cal. Rptr. 465, 550 P.2d 1001 (1976); see also Amster-
dam-Manhattan, Inc. v. City Rent and Rehabilitation Admin., 15 N.Y.2d 1014, 260 N.Y.S.
2d 23, 207 N.E.2d 611 (1965). See generally United States Trust v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1,
22 n.19 (1971). It was previously required that rent controls could only be imposed where an
emergency existed. Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503 (1944); Woods v. Miller, 333 U.S.
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controls is now based upon the state's general police power and
"upon the actual existence of a housing shortage and its concomi-
tant ill effects ... ,159 Conversion moratoriums should similarly
be sustained where it is shown that a rental housing shortage ex-
ists. The extremely low rental vacancy rates in areas where conver-
sion moratoriums have been enacted indicate that a rental housing
shortage exists in these areas.6 0 In fact, it is precisely because of
rental housing shortages that localities have deemed it necessary to
impose conversion moratoriums. 6'
Claridge House did not rule on the issue of whether the conver-
sion moratorium before the court constituted a deprivation of
plaintiff's property without due process of law. In addition, Chi-
cago Real Estate Board did not analyze this issue, but concluded
summarily that the conversion moratorium was a deprivation of
property without due process of law."6 2
An examination of a case challenging another type of morato-
rium on similar constitutional grounds may provide a more com-
plete answer to how a court could resolve this issue in the future. In
Smoke Rise, Inc. v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission,"3
real estate developers brought an action against the Maryland De-
partment of Health and Mental Hygiene challenging the constitu-
tionality of various sewer hook-up moratoriums. The plaintiffs
planned to subdivide their- land into small, single-family homes.
However, a five year moratorium designed to protect the state wa-
ters from contamination by sewage overflow prevented them from
obtaining the necessary sewer hook-ups. The developers sought de-
claratory and injunctive relief on the grounds that they had been
deprived of their property without due process of law in violation of
the fourteenth amendment."' The court stated that "no depriva-
138 (1948).
159. Birkenfield v. City of Berkeley, 130 Cal. Rptr. 465, 488, 550 P.2d 1001, 1024 (1976).
160. See note 37 supra and accompanying text.
161. See, e.g., Verona Ordinance, supra note 46, which states in part, "it has been deter-
mined . . . that an emergency exists within the Borough of Verona with respect to the un-
availability of rental housing space .... .. Accord, Los Angeles, Cal., Ordinance 153,251
(Dec. 17, 1979) (to be codified in Los ANGELES, CAL., CODE § 47.06(A) (1979); Fort Lee Ordi-
nance, supra note 46.
162. Partial Transcript of Proceedings at 6, Chicago Real Estate Bd. v. City of Chicago,
No. 79 C 1284 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 20, 1979) (order granting preliminary injunction).
163. 400 F. Supp. 1369 (D. Md. 1975).
164. Id. at 1372.
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tion of property without due process will be found where the police
power has been exercised in a reasonable manner, and the reasona-
bleness of the moratoria ordinances in the instant case must be
measured with regard to their duration as well as their purpose."'' 5
The court held that the statute satisfied both requirements and
granted the defendant's motion to dismiss. 6'
As discussed above, often the duration of a conversion morato-
rium depends upon the time necessary to study the problems re-
sulting from the conversion trend and to enact permanent protec-
tive legislation.' Other conversion moratoriums are tied to the
vacancy rate.6 8 Both of these durations seem to be reasonable. If a
five year sewer moratorium was held to be a reasonable duration, it
is likely that a court would find a one year conversion moratorium
to be reasonable.' Furthermore, the purposes of a conversion mor-
atorium are to prevent displacement and to avoid the further re-
duction of the rental housing supply in a community until its gov-
erning body can develop a plan for regulation in this area. These
are clearly reasonable purposes on which to base collective action.
3. Taking Without Compensation
Building owners have argued that conversion moratoriums have
taken their property without just compensation in violation of the
fifth amendment by prohibiting them from withdrawing their prop-
erty from the rental market.70 Whereas the Supreme Court has rec-
ognized that the "Fifth Amendment's guarantee [is] designed to
bar government from forcing some people alone to bear public bur-
dens which in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the pub-
165. Id. at 1385.
166. Id. at 1394.
167. See note 46 supra and accompanying text,
168. For example, the Fort Lee Ordinance, supra note 46, § 5(c) provides that "[t]his
moratorium shall expire upon the occurrence of the earliest of the following: . .. (c) a va-
cancy rate greater than 5/100 .... "
169. See also Wincamp Partnership v. Anne Arundel County Md., 458 F. Supp. 1009 (D.
Md. 1978) (two year moratorium, with certain limitations, on the development or sale of all
parcels of unimproved real property in excess of three acres owned by water companies held-
reasonable).
170. Brief and Appendix on Behalf of Plaintiffs at 16, Claridge House One, Inc. v. Bor-
ough of Verona, No. 79-2765 (D.N.J. Dec. 28, 1979); Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support of
the Motion for a Preliminary Injunction at 14, Chicago Real Estate Bd., Inc. v. City of
Chicago, No. 79 C 1284 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 20, 1979) (order granting preliminary injunction).
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lic as a whole,"'' it has been "unable to develop any 'set formula'
for determining when 'justice and fairness' require that the eco-
nomic injuries caused by public action be compensated by the gov-
ernment, rather than remain disproportionately concentrated on a
few persons.'1 2 Essentially the Court engages in ad hoc factual in-
quiries to determine whether a taking has occurred and compensa-
tion is due.' However, out of these decisions, two significant fac-
tors can be identified. First, the economic impact of the regulation
on the claimant and the intent to which the regulation has inter-
fered with distinct investment-backed expectations are relevant.',
Second, the character of the governmental action is also important.
Often a "taking" is found when the interference with the property
can be characterized as a physical invasion by government rather
than an interference arising from some public program adjusting
the benefits and burden of economic life to promote the common
good.' There is no physical invasion by the government when it
imposes a conversion moratorium. Rather, there is an interference
with the owner's ability to alienate his property, presumably to
promote the common good. Whether this interference constitutes a
taking, therefore, depends upon its economic impact on the con-
verter. In Claridge House the court noted only that "plaintiffs' tak-
ing without just compensation claim [cannot] be disregarded as
completely without merit. The value of plaintiffs' property has...
been substantially reduced by defendant's actions.""' Due to the
dearth of the court's analysis on this issue, it is necessary to ex-
amine other taking cases to understand the substance of this claim.
In Smoke Rise Inc. v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Commis-
sion, "I the developers argued that because the moratoriums pre-
cluded them from subdividing their land into single family lots
171. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960) (government's complete destruc-
tion of a materialmen's lien in certain property held a "taking").
172. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). See
United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155, 168 (1958). See also Michelman,
Property, Utility and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensa-
tion" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Michelman]; Sax, Takings and
The Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964).
173. 438 U.S. at 124.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. No. 79-2765, slip op. at 2.
177. 400 F. Supp. 1369 (D. Md. 1975).
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their property had been taken without just compensation. The
court first evaluated this argument under the traditional analysis;
to wit, whether the moratoriums prevented a public harm or pro-
moted a public gain.'78 According to this view, only the latter re-
quires that compensation be paid.'"' The court held that the sewer
moratoriums did not constitute a taking because their purpose was
to prevent a public harm, not to promote a public gain. To the
extent that conversion moratoriums require landlords to provide
rental housing to the community, their purpose is to promote a
public gain for which compensation should be paid.' Conversion
moratoriums, however, have been enacted to prevent the harm
caused by displacement and depletion of the rental housing sup-
ply."' On balance, it appears that conversion moratoriums are en-
acted to prevent public harm and according to the traditional view
should be upheld as a valid exercise of the police power for which
no compensation is due.8 '
The Smoke Rise court also evaluated the sewer moratoriums
under the modern view that "no taking arises unless the property
has been rendered worthless or useless."'' 8 The court noted that the
moratorium only prohibited the developers from subdividing their
land into small, single family lots. By selecting a different, less
profitable use for their land, these developers could get sewer ser-
vice. It could not be said that under these circumstances the devel-
opers' land had been rendered worthless or useless so as to estab-
lish a taking. This test focuses on the economic impact of the
moratorium on the owner."' Applying this test to conversion
moratoriums, such statutes should be upheld because a conversion
moratorium does not render an apartment building useless to its
178. Id. at 1382. This view is espoused in E. FREUND, THE POuCE POWER 546-47 (1904).
179. 400 F. Supp. at 1382.
180. See Michelman, supra note 172, at 1181-84.
181. See, e.g., Los ANGELES, CAL., CODE § 47.06 (A) (1979) which provides that "[alt the
present time, there is a critically short supply of rental housing in the City of Los Angeles.
Many rental housing units have been removed from the rental market through conversion to
condominiums [and] stock cooperatives . . . .Tenants who are evicted due to conversions
are experiencing serious difficulties in locating comparable replacement rental housing." Ac-
cord, Verona Ordinance, supra note 46.
182. Prof. Michelman would argue that even if it were found that compensation was due,
it would be too difficult to evaluate and therefore should not be paid. Michelman, supra note
172, at 1258.
183. 400 F. Supp. at 1382.
184. See note 175 supra and accompanying text.
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owner. It could still be operated as a rental apartment building or
sold to a single purchaser. Thus, no taking would occur under this
modern theory.
In Sun Oil Co. of Pennsylvania v. Goldstein, I" wherein the court
employed the modern test, the plaintiff challenged a conversion
moratorium law prohibiting owners of fuel service stations from
converting to gas-only stations for a period of two years. The plain-
tiff alleged, among other things, that the moratorium constituted a
taking because it required the plaintiff to maintain repair facilities
for public benefit without assuring a fair rate of return.1" The court
held that the oil company was not deprived of its property without
just compensation by being forced to operate less profitable service
stations. The company was not forced to continue operations at
any station, was not required to continue in any lease agreement,
was not required to maintain repair services at any station it chose
to close, and was free to close any unprofitable station and build a
gas-only station at any other location.'87 Applying the rule of Sun
Oil, conversion moratoriums should be upheld provided owners can
obtain a fair rate of return on their buildings.'"8
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York' is the
most recent Supreme Court decision addressing the question of
what constitutes a taking. In that case, Grand Central Station was
declared a "landmark" pursuant to the Landmarks Preservation
Law of the City of New York. Thereafter, in an effort to increase its
income, Penn Central, the owner of the terminal, entered into a
fifty year renewable lease and sublease agreement whereby the
lessee Was to construct a multi-story office tower above the termi-
nal. 10 The lessee promised to pay Penn Central one million dollars
annually during construction and at least three million dollars an-
nually thereafter. 9' The Landmarks Preservation Commission re-
185. 453 F. Supp. 787 (D. Md. 1978), aff'd, 594 F.2d 859 (4th Cir. 1979).
186. Id. at 794.
187. Id.
188. For example, the Fort Lee Moratorium was limited to buildings covered by the Bor-
ough's Rent Leveling Ordinance so owners could obtain a fair rate of return on their build-
ings by administrative or judicial means during the pendency of the moratorium. Brief in
Opposition to Order to Show Cause at 15, Hampshire House Sponsor Corp. v. Borough of
Fort Lee, No. L-11977-79 P.W. (N.J. Super. Ct. Dec. 20, 1979).
189. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
190. Id. at 116.
191. Id.
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jected the plans for the multi-story building on the ground that
such a massive structure would be aesthetically inconsistent with
the terminal's architectural style."' Penn Central and the lessee
filed suit charging that the application of the landmarks law con-
stituted a taking of property without just compensation.
Penn Central argued that the landmarks law deprived them of
any gainful use of their "air rights" above the terminal and that,
irrespective of the value of the remainder of their parcel, the city
had taken their right to the super adjacent air space, thus entitling
them to compensation."' The Court rejected this argument, stating
that "the submission that [plaintiffs] may establish a 'taking' sim-
ply by showing that they have been denied the ability to exploit a
property interest that they heretofore had believed was available
for development is quite simply untenable.""' The Court focused
"on the nature and extent of the interference with rights in the
parcel as a whole" and not on the fact that a discrete segment of
the parcel may "have been entirely abrogated.""'5 Although Penn
Central may have been deprived of its air rights above the termi-
nal, it could still continue to use the property exactly as it had in
the past-as a railroad terminal containing office space and conces-
sions. Therefore, the Court held that the application of New York
City's Landmarks Preservation Law did not effect a taking."' The
law did not interfere with Penn Central's present use of the build-
ing and permitted "reasonable beneficial use of [it]. '""
The Court alsoconsidered the economic impact of the landmarks
law on Penn Central, noting that, despite the interference with its
air rights, Penn Central had failed to show that it was unable to
earn a reasonable return on the building."' The Court stated, "[w]e
emphasize that our holding today . . . is based on Penn Central's
present ability to use the Terminal for its intended purposes and in
a gainful fashion.""'
192. Id. at 117-18.
193. Id. at 130.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 138.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 121-22. This conclusion was made by the New York Court of Appeals, 42
N.Y.2d 324, 333-36, 366 N.E.2d 1271, 1276-78, 397 N.Y.S.2d 914, 919-22 (1977) and affirmed
by the Supreme Court.
199. 438 U.S. at 138 n.36. The city had conceded in oral argument that if the owner
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Penn Central sheds light on the issues raised by taking chal-
lenges to conversion moratoriums. First, like the landmarks law, a
conversion moratorium only interferes with one of the interests in-
herent in the ownership of a building, the right to sell the building.
Second, like the landmarks law,2°° conversion moratoriums do not
deny owners every use of their property. Moratoriums only prohibit
the sale of the individual apartments. 0' Buildings remain usable as
rental buildings and can be sold as such. Although moratoriums
prevent the conversion of a building to ownership status and de-
prive the owner of the huge returns which usually result from a
conversion, this is not under Penn Central enough to constitute a
taking.
There might be instances in which Penn Central could provide
the basis for granting relief to a potential converter requesting com-
pensation. If an owner could show that he could no longer make a
profit through the operation of rental apartments because of rent
controls, maintenance costs, and real estate taxes, and, conse-
quently, that he could not sell the building as a rental building,
then some form of compensation would be due.0 2 In such a case the
owner would meet the test set forth in Penn Central that the taking
deprived him of a "reasonable beneficial use" of the building.21"
4. Equal Protection
To determine whether a conversion moratorium violates the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment the test is
whether the classifications created by conversion moratoriums are
rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest.10' Concern
for the displacement of tenants and the depletion of the existing
rental housing stock is a legitimate governmental interest. The
question, then, is whether these classifications are rationally re-
demonstrated at some time in the future that circumstances had changed such that the
terminal ceased to be "economically viable," the owner could obtain financial relief. Id.
200. Id. at 136-37. A smaller harmonious structure may have been permitted to be built
above the terminal. Id.
201. See moratoriums cited in note 46 supra.
202. See notes 3-8 supra and accompanying text. See, e.g., Segarra-Serra v. Scott, 242 F.
2d 315 (1st Cir. 1957) (where the court held it unconstitutional to require an owner to show
that he has a financial loss before his building can be removed from the rental market).
203. 438 U.S. at 138.
204. See generally New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976); Weber v. Aetna Cas.
& Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 172 (1972).
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lated to meeting this interest. These classifications must be ex-
amined separately to determine if they meet this requirement.
Conversion moratoriums only restrict the conversion of existing
rental apartments to ownership status and do not prohibit the con-
struction of new condominiums or cooperatives. ' Thus, the class
burdened by the ordinance consists of present owners of rental
apartment buildings. This classification is rationally related to the
municipal government purpose behind conversion moratoriums:
minimizing the displacement of existing tenants and preserving ex-
isting rental housing. New condominiums or cooperatives do not
cause displacement and do not erode the rental housing supply.
A second classification is found in moratoriums that only pro-
hibit conversions to condominiums but not to cooperatives. 206 This
classification may more easily be characterized as arbitrary and
unreasonable. The displacement of non-purchasing tenants and de-
pletion of the rental housing stock occurs equally with respect to
the conversion of rental apartments to condominiums and to coop-
eratives 207 The Verona, New Jersey conversion moratorium illus-
trates this type of: classification by restricting only conversions to
condominiums. 28 The court in Claridge House commented that
'ithe equal protection arguments cannot be discarded as frivolous.
Classifications are.drawn by the ordinance in question, and while a
municipality has much leeway in creating categories, they may not
be totally arbitrary or unreasonable. 200
A third classification made in moratorium legislation prohibits
certain size buildings from being converted. 211 The Chicago morato-
tium which prohibited the conversion of rental buildings containing
thirty units or more to condominiums is an example .2t The court
in Chicago Real Estate Board held that the moratorium was un-
6onstitutional because, in part, it was "arbitrary in the selection of
205. Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support of the Motion for a Preliminary Injunction at
29, Chicago Real Estate Bd., Inc. v. City of Chicago, No. 79 C 1284 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 20,
1979)(order granting preliminary injunction).
206. PHLADELPHIA, PA., ConE §§ 9-1201 to -1208 (1979); Chicago Ordinance, supra note
46; Verona Ordinance, supra note 46.
207. See notes 31-40 supra and accompanying text.
208. Verona Ordinance, supra note 46.
209. No. 79-2765, slip op. at 3.
210. Chicago Ordinance, supra note 46.
211. Id. § 1.
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a 30-unit cut-off, thereby denying equal protection of the law."',
The test is whether there is a rationale basis for such a cut-off.
Presumably, the larger the building the greater the possibility of
displacement. However, the Chicago Real Estate Board court ap-
pears to have rejected this argument. Therefore, an ordinance lim-
iting conversions on the basis of building size would require a
strong argument on the side of the municipality.
B. State Constitutional Claims
A municipality is a creature of state law having no inherent pow-
ers to adopt ordinances or regulations; it possesses only those pow-
ers granted to it by the state legislature."' In general, municipal
powers may be granted by a home rule provision"' or by express
authorization. "' Except in limited instances, state action may pre-
empt local initiative even where a municipality has been granted
power to act."' In New Jersey, for example, municipalities have
been granted a wide range of powers through a home rule provision
granting them the power to enact laws for the "preservation of the
public health, safety and welfare." ''t Although the New Jersey
212. No. 79 C 1284, slip op. at 6.
213. See, e.g., Datisman v. Gary Pub. Library, 241 Ind. 83, 170 N.E.2d 55 (1960); Maddy
v. City Council of Ottumwa, 226 Iowa 941, 285 N.W. 208 (1939); Board of Trustees of Police-
men's & Firemen's Retirement Fund v. City of Paducah, 333 S.W.2d 515 (Ky. Ct. App.
1960); Highland Park v. Fair Employment Practices Comm'n, 364 Mich. 508, 111 N.W.2d
797 (1961); Sussex Woodlands, Inc. v. Mayor & Council of West Milford, 109 N.J. Super.
432, 263 A.2d 502 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1970).
214. Municipal home rule in its broadest sense means the power of local self-govern-
ment. Any power of local self-government, therefore, in whatever manner arising,
whether inherent as sometimes claimed, or conferred or recognized by constitutional
or statutory grant, or powers emanating from the people of the local community
themselves and set forth in a charter authorized by the state organic law, would be
included. The phrase is usually associated with powers vested in cities and towns, by
constitutional or statutory provisions, particularly the former, and more especially or-
ganic authorization to the local inhabitants to frame and adopt their own municipal
charters. Rights thus emanating by constitutional grant are viewed as constitutional
rights protected from invasion or interference by the people of the state in their repre-
sentative legislative capacity. Cities and towns having constitutional, freeholders or
home-rule charters, in theory at least, derive their power of local self-government from
the state constitution.
1 E. McQuILLAN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 1.41 (3d ed. 1971) (footnote
omitted).
215. Id.
216. 6 id. § 21.34.
217. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:48-2 (West 1967).
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Constitution provides that municipal legislation is to be liberally
construed in the municipality's favor,"'8 the ordinance will be found
to be preempted where a municipal ordinance conflicts with a com-
prehensive state regulatory scheme."'
In Claridge House,220 plaintiffs brought an action in the Federal
District Court of New Jersey 221 alleging that the Verona conversion
moratorium22 2 was preempted by state law. 23 The New Jersey legis-
lature had passed three state laws which regulated conversions: 1)
the Eviction for Cause Law, 22' 2) the Condominium Act, 225 and 3)
the Planned Real Estate Development Full Disclosure Act. 26 The
Eviction for Cause Law provides for the removal of non-purchasing
tenants in a conversion of rental units to condominiums. The Con-
dominium Act regulates the creation, administration, taxing and
termination of condominiums. The Planned Real Estate Develop-
ment Full Disclosure Act requires developers to register condominii-
ums and regulates the contents of the Registration Statement.
The court in Claridge House stated that preemption would be
found where a state regulatory scheme is so comprehensive that it
218. N.J. CONST. art. 4, § 7, 11.
219. See Garden State Farms, Inc. v. Bay, 77 N.J. 439, 450, 390 A.2d 1177, 1182 (1978):
A legislative intent to preempt a field will be found either where the state scheme is
so pervasive or comprehensive that it effectively precludes the coexistence of munici-
pal regulation or where the local regulation conflicts with the state statutes or stands
as an obstacle to a state policy expressed in enactments of the Legislature.
220. No. 79-2765 (D.N.J. Dec. 28, 1979).
221. Subject matter jurisdiction in federal district courts was predicated on a federal
question. See pt. III(A) supra for discussion of these issues. Plaintiffs also alleged that the
district court had competence to hear their state claim through the exercise of pendent juris-
diction. See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966). Federal courts have become
liberal in granting pendent jurisdiction, requiring only that the federal constitutional claim
supporting pendent jurisdiction not be insubstantial or frivolous. Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S.
528, 536-37 (1974); Louise B. v. Coluatti, 606 F.2d 392, 400 (3d Cir. 1979); Shands v. Tull,
602 F.2d 1156, 1158 (3d Cir. 1979). The district court granted pendent jurisdiction to hear
the state claims. Curiously the court did not rule on any of plaintiffs federal claims. See pt.
III(A) supra.
222. See Verona Ordinance, supra note 46.
223. State constitutional claims can be brought on one of two grounds: whether the mu-
nicipality has the power to act or assuming a power to act, whether the municipal ordinance
is preempted by state law. The grounds are separate and distinct. Although the Claridge
House court recognizes this distinction, its holding was limited to the preemption issue. No.
79-2765, slip op. at 3.
224. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A: 18-61.1 to -61.13 (West Supp. 1979).
225. Id. §§ 46.83-1 to -30.
226. Id. §§ 45:22A-21 to -42.
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precludes peaceful coexistence of a municipal regulation, where the
local ordinance conflicts with state statutes or where local law
stands as an obstacle to an expressed state policy.227 The court held
that the Eviction statute preempted any local law in this area."
The court stated that the Verona moratorium which prohibited
eviction of non-purchasing tenants in a conversion could not coex-
ist with a comprehensive statute designed to regulate eviction. For
similar reasons the court held that the Condominium Act and the
Planned Real Estate Development Full Disclosure Act preempted
the local moratorium. 2 9
The rules governing preemption and power vary in every jurisdic-
tion.no However, local ordinances imposing moratoriums on conver-
sions are invariably subject to challenges based on state law on the
grounds that a municipality lacks the power to enact the ordi-
nances23' or that its power has been preempted by state regulations.
IV. Laws Regulating Conversions
Conversion moratoriums can offer only a temporary solution to
the problems resulting from conversions. Long term solutions, en-
acted at the local level, which balance the interests of landlords
and tenants are necessary to protect their respective rights and to
enhance the quality of life in urban areas. The comprehensive state
and municipal laws which regulate the conversion of rental apart-
ments to condominiums and cooperatives presently in effect in
New York City and Washington, D.C. may provide models for ju-
risdictions considering enacting protective legislation of this kind.
This part of the Comment will investigate these and local Califor-
nia ordinances.
A. New York City
The conversion of rental apartments to cooperative or condomin-
227. No. 79-2765, slip op. at 5 (citing Garden State Farms, Inc. v. Bay, 77 N.J. 439, 450,
390 A.2d 1177, 1182 (1979)).
228. No. 79-2765, slip op. at 7; accord, Hampshire House Sponsor Corp. v. Borough of
Fort Lee, No. L-11977-79 P.W. (N.J. Super. Ct. Dec. 20, 1979).
229. No. 79-2765, slip op. at 9.
230. See 6 E. MCQUILLAN, THE LAw OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §§ 21.33, 21.34 and cases
cited therein.
231. See discussion of Washington Home Ownership Council, pt. 11(C) supra, a unique
case in which a conversion moratorium was challenged on the grounds that the local govern-
ment lacked the power to enact it.
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ium status in New York City is governed by state laws"' and local
ordinances.23 The state laws include one regulating the offering of
real estate securities"' and a recently enacted law protecting senior
citizens and other tenants in conversions."5 There is no single city
ordinance which regulates conversions. Rather, provisions of the
New York City Rent and Rehabilitation Law ("Rent Control
Law")Y and the New York City Rent Stabilization Law27 ("Rent
Stabilization Law") govern the rights of city tenants faced with a
conversion, especially their right to be protected frorm eviction.
There are currently two types of conversions permitted in New
York City, namely, eviction plans and non-eviction plans. 38 Under
an eviction plan, tenants may be evicted only if the converter has
complied with the requirements of the Rent Control Law or the
Rent Stabilization Law.29 The most important of these require-
ments is that at least thirty-five percent of the tenants in occu-
pancy must consent to purchase their apartments before a conver-
sion can be declared effective and evictions are permitted.2 "0
232. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 352-e (McKinney 1968 & Supp. 1979); id. § 352-eeee (McKin-
ney Supp. 1979).
233. New York City Rent and Eviction Regs. § 55 (these regulations may be found
following N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW § 8700 (McKinney 1974) [hereinafter cited as N.Y.C. Rent
and Eviction Rgs.]. NEW YORK, N.Y. ADMIN. CODE § YY51-6.0(c)(9) (1975 & Supp. 1979).
234. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 352-e (McKinney 1968 & Supp. 1979).
235. Id. § 352-eeee (McKinney Supp. 1979).
236. NEW YORK, N.Y. ADMIN. CODE §§ Y51-1.0 to -18.0 (1975 & Supp. 1979). See note 6
supra, for a discussion of this law. The eviction of rent controlled tenants in buildings con-
verted to cooperative or condominium status is governed by N.Y.C. Rent and Eviction Regs.
supra note 233, § 55. These regulations have been promulgated pursuant to Section Y51-
5.0(g) of the Rent Control Law which empowers the City Rent Agency to promulgate regula-
tions to effectuate the purposes of the law, and specifically, pursuant to Section Y51-6.0(c)
of the Rent Control Law which permits regulations deemed necessary or proper for the con-
trol of eviction. NEW YORK, N.Y. ADMIN. CODE §§ Y51-5.0(g), Y51-6.0(c) (1975).
237. NEW YORK, N.Y. ADMIN. CODE §§ YY51-1.0 to -8.0 (1975 & Supp. 1979). See
note 6 supra for a discussion of this law. The provisions respecting the eviction of rent
stabilized tenants in the case of a conversion are found at id. § YY51-6.0(c)(9) (1975).
238. Lehner & Sweet, supra note 6, at 34, col. 5. These concepts do not appear in the
rent control or rent stabilization laws but rather, developed through practice. The term
"eviction plan" is defined in the new state law as a "plan which, pursuant to the provisions
of any law or regulation governing rentals and continuing occupancy, can result in the evic-
tion of non-purchasing tenants by reason of the tenant failing to purchase pursuant thereto."
N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 352-eeee(1)(b) (McKinney Supp. 1979).
239. Lehner & Sweet, supra, note 6, at 34, col. 5.
240. N.Y.C. Rent and Eviction Regs., supra note 233, § 55c(3)(a)(for conversions to coop-
eratives) and id. § 55f(3)(b) (for conversions to condominiums). NEW YORK, N.Y. ADMIN.
CODE § 51-6.0(c)(9)(a) (1975).
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In order to circumvent the requirement that thirty-five percent of
the tenants agree to purchase their apartments prior to conversion,
developers began to permit non-purchasing tenants to remain in
their apartments during and subsequent to conversion. "' The term
"non-eviction plan" was derived from this practice. This is a valid
practice because there are no statutory provisions regulating non-
eviction plans and therefore consent by a minimum number of te-
nants is not necessary for the plan to be declared effective."' Thus,
non-eviction plans have been commonly referred to as "outside the
law." '243 For a short period, this practice was made illegal by the
Goodman-Dearie Law. " This state law provided that before a con-
version plan could be declared effective, even if it did not envision
the eviction of non-purchasing tenants, thirty-five percent of the
tenants in occupancy had to first agree to purchase their apart-
ments. A plan had to be declared effective within one year of its
presentation to tenants or be abandoned, in which case a new plan
could not be submitted to tenants for another eighteen months.2 15
Thus, the law mandated a thirty-five percent tenant consent at all
times and thereby abolished the so-called non-eviction plan. The
practice of converting buildings pursuant to non-eviction plans,
however, regained popularity" ' after the Goodman-Dearie Law was
allowed to expire in July 1977.47
1. Eviction Plans
A conversion plan that involves the eviction of non-purchasing
tenants from their apartments must be filed with the Attorney
General248 and must comply with the provisions of the Rent Control
241. Lehner & Sweet, supra note 6, at 25, col. 2.
242. Id. at 34, col. 5.
243. Id. at 25, col. 2. "Contrary to the impression which might be gained from the term
'outside the law,' these plans [are] not illegal." Id.
244. 1974 N.Y. Laws ch. 1021, § 2. This law was in effect from June 15, 1974 through
July 1, 1977.
245. Id. § 2(2-a)(1)(i)-(ii).
246. See Lehner & Sweet, supra note 6, at 35, col. 4.
247. The precise reason why the Goodman-Dearie Law was permitted to expire is un-
clear. However, likely explanations include the presence of a strong real estate lobby that
favored its expiration and the feeling that the provisions of the rent control and rent
stabilizaion laws provided adequate safeguards. For a discussion of the issues being debated
at that time, see N.Y. Times, Apr. 24, 1977, at 26, col. 1; id., Apr. 8, 1977, at 15, col. 1; id.,
Mar. 13, 1977, at 30, col. 1.
248. The New York General Business Law requires that every offering statement or pro-
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Law or the Rent Stabilization Law. These laws are designed not
only to protect tenants from eviction but also to give them time to
learn of the conversion, to decide whether to purchase their apart-
ment and to give them a voice in the decision of whether the build-
ing should be converted."'
a. Rent Controlled Apartments
Tenants of rent controlled apartments are given a number of
time periods in which to decide to purchase. Initially; each tenant
has an exclusive right for sixty days from the date the converter
presents him with a copy of the conversion plan to purchase, the
apartment.'" In order for the conversion plan to be declared effec-
tive by the Attorney General, at least thrity-five percent of the rent
controlled tenants in possession at the time of presentation of the
plan2 1 must agree to purchase their apartments within a six month
spectus relating to the conversion of rental apartments to condominiums or cooperatives be
submitted for filing to the New York State Department of Law (the Attorney General's of.
fice). N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 352-e(1) (McKinney 1968 & Supp. 1979). The Attorney General
has 30 days after submission of the offering statement in which to issue a letter stating that
the offering has been accepted for filing or setting forth the reasons for his refusal. Id. §
352(e)(2) (McKinney Supp. 1979). The issuance of the Attorney General's letter indicating
that the offering statements have been filed permits the converter to present the plan to the
tenants. Id.
249. This period also allows tenants time to study the provisions of the conversion plan
and suggest amendments. Although a converter can amend a proposed eviction plan to pro-
vide that it shall be a non-eviction plan, the Attorney General requires that if such amend-
ment is made, a purchaser must be given the right to cancel his agreement to purchase.
Lehner & Sweet, supra, note 6, at 35, col. 5. This may be because non-eviction plans often
result in "hybrid" buildings in which purchasers may not wish to live. See notes 278-80 infra
and accompanying text. In contrast it is important to note that non-eviction plans may not
be amended to eviction plans just because the converter has met the 35% consent require-
ment for such plans. Non-purchasing tenants should be able to rely on the converter's repre-
sentation that they will not be evicted.
250. N.Y.C. Rent & Eviction Regs., supra note 233, § 55(c)(3)(a) (for conversion to coop-
eratives). Id. § 55(f)(3)(b)(3)(i) (for conversion to condominium). Accord, ALAMEDA, CAL.,
CODE § 11-14D6(b) (1977); Los Angeles, Cal., Ordinance 153,024 (Oct. 4, 1979); SAN FRAN-
CISCO, CALIF., CODE § 1387(b) (1979); Seattle, Wash., Ordinance 107707, § 3.3 (Oct. 4, 1978).
See also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-61.8 (West Supp. 1979) (90 day exclusive right to
purchase); CONCORD, CAL., CODE § 4478(B) (May 18, 1979) (90 day right of first refusal);
DALY Crry, CAL., CODE § 26-106h(4) (July 9, 1979) (90 day right of first refusal); EvANSTON,
ILL. CODE ch. 10-1/2, § 4-102 (1979) (120 day right of first refusal from date tenants receive
notice of intent to convert or 30 days from filing of condominium instruments, whichever is
longer).
251. N.Y.C. Rent & Eviction Rep., supra note 233, § 55(c)(3)(a) (cooperative conver-
sions). Where the apartment is to be converted to a condominium 35% of the tenants resid-
ing in the building at the time of recording the declaration of condominium must consent.
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period. 5' If at least thirty-five percent of the rent controlled te-
nants do not agree to purchase within six months, the plan will not
be declared effective and must be abandoned. A period of eighteen
months from the date of presentation of the first plan must elapse
before another conversion plan may be presented to the tenants.2 3
If thirty-five percent of the rent controlled tenants agree to
purchase and the plan is declared effective, those tenants who have
not yet agreed to buy their apartment are given an additional
thirty day period to buy on the previously offered terms.2 ' The
apartment may be offered for sale to an outsider if the tenant does
not exercise this privilege within this thirty day period. However,
the non-purchasing tenant must then be given an additional fifteen
day period within which to purchase the apartment before it can be
offered for sale to an outsider at more favorable terms than those
previously offered to the tenant. 5 Thus, a rent controlled tenant is
given a total of 105 days to decide whether to purchase the apart-
ment. A purchaser of the apartment will have a right to obtain a
certificate of eviction in order to gain possession of the apartment
"for his own personal use" ' if the conversion plan is declared ef-
fective and the tenant has not purchased the apartment during any
of these periods. However, a non-purchasing tenant cannot be
evicted until two years after the sale of the apartment unless eighty
percent of the apartments in the building have been sold to te-
rants.257 This two year period before a non-purchasing tenant can
Id. § 55(f)(3)(b)(3)(ii). See also SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., CODE § 1388 (1979) (no application for
conversion shall be approved unless 40% of the tenants sign intent to purchase forms).
252. N.Y.C. Rent & Eviction Regs., supra note 233, § 55(c)(3)(a) (cooperative conver-
sions). When the apartment is being converted to a condominium, this six month period
runs from the date the offering statement is formally filed with the Attorney General. Id. §
55(0(6).
253. Id. § 55(c)(9) (cooperative conversions). In the case of a conversion to a condomin-
ium, 18 months "from the date of the formal filing of the ... offering plan with the" Attor-
ney General must elapse before another may be presented to the tenants. Id. § 55(0(6). See
also SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., CODE § 1394 (1979) (An application for conversion which is with-
drawn by the applicant may not be resubmitted for 6 months from the date of withdrawal.
An application which is denied may not be resubmitted for one year from the date of
denial).
254. N.Y.C. Rent & Eviction Regs., supra note 233, §§ 55(c)(3)(b), 55(f)(3)(f). Accord,
EVANSTON, ILL., CODE ch. 10-11/, § 4-102(a) (Mar. 5, 1979).
255. N.Y.C. Rent & Eviction Regs., supra note 233, §§ 55(c)(3)(d), 55(f)(3)(f).
256. Id. § 55(c)(2), 55(f).
257. Id. § 55(c)(1)(c)-(d), 55(f)(1)(b)-(c). See also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-61.2(g)
(West Supp. 1979) (Three years prior notice is required before a dispossess action can be
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be evicted is designed to give the tenant sufficient time to find a
new apartment and relocate.
If eighty percent of the apartments have been sold to tenants,
the purchaser of the apartment may obtain a certificate of eviction
immediately. 5 The possibility of an immediate eviction because
the eighty percent requirement has been met remains, especially in
times such as these when many tenants quickly accept converter's
offers to sell their apartments."' Perhaps the effects of this
provision could be ameliorated by providing the n6n-purchasing
tenant with more time to find another residence.
b. Rent Stabilized Apartments
The time periods in which a rent stabilized tenant must decide
whether to purchase his apartment in an eviction plan differ from
those set forth above respecting rent controlled tenants. 6 ' Each
tenant has an initial exclusive right for ninety days from the date
the conversion plan is presented to him to purchase his apart-
ment.2 ' Subsequent to the expiration of this period, a tenant who
has not agreed to purchase his apartment is given the exclusive
right, for an additional six months, to purchase the apartment on
the same terms and conditions as the converter may offer to a non-
instituted, and the action must await the expiration of the lease. Comparable housing may
be requested of the landlord by the tenant within the first 18 months of the three years
notice. Id. § 1-61.61. The owner must prove that a tenant was offered such comparable hous-
ing and a reasonable opportunity to inspect it. Id. Under the provision, courts can grant up
to five one-year stays of eviction if it is not satisfied that the tenants was offered comparable
housing and a reasonable opportunity to inspect it. Id. No more than a one-year stay shall
be granted if the owner waives payment of five months rent. Id.; ALAMEDA, CAL., CODE § 11-
14D6 (1977) (120 days written notice of intention to convert before tenants are required to
relocate); CONCORD, CAL., CODE § 4478(A) (1979) (120 days written notice of intention to
convert prior to any terminating tenancy); SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., CODE § 1391(a) (Each non-
purchasing tenant shall be given 120 days from the date of receipt of a ratification of intent
to convert or until the expiration of his lease to relocate). EVANSTON, ILL., CODE ch. 10-'/2,
§ 4-101(c) (1979) (no tenant may be required to vacate upon less than 210 days notice or
the expiration of the lease for the apartment, whichever is longer).
258. N.Y.C. Rent & Eviction Regs., supra note 233, §§ 55(c)(1)(c)-(d), 55(f)(1)(b)-(c).
259. See generally Why Condominium Ownership is Gaining New Support, N.Y. Times,
Nov. 2, 1979, at 19, col. 1; Discount Prices, supra note 16, at 1, col. 1.
260. For a detailed discussion of the interplay between these provisions of the rent con-
trol and rent stablization laws, see Lehner & Sweet, supra note 6.
261. NEW YORK, N.Y. ADMIN. CODE § YY51-6.0(c)(9)(b) (1975). The same provisions of
the Rent Stabilization Law apply for both cooperative and condominium plans. See note 250
supra for a comparison with other ordinances.
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tenant.2 ' This right must be exercised within fifteen days after re-
ceiving notification that a non-tenant has agreed to purchase the
apartment .1
The Rent Stabilization Law also contains a provision, similar to
that found in the Rent Control Law,"' requiring that a minimum
percentage of tenants consent to the conversion. In order for an
eviction plan to be declared effective under the rent stabilization
law, thirty-five percent of all tenants in occupancy on the date the
plan is accepted for filing by the Attorney General must agree to
purchase their apartments within eighteen months of the date
that the plan is presented to the tenants.2" If at least thirty-five
percent of the tenants in occupancy do not agree to purchase their
apartments within eighteen months, the eviction plan will not be
declared effective and must be abandoned. 7 Should the plan be
262. NEW YORK, N.Y. ADMIN. CODE § YY51-6.0(c)(9)(c) (1975).
263. Id.
264. See note 251 supra and accompanying text.
265. NEW YORK, N.Y. ADMIN. CODE § YY51-6.0(c)(9)(a) (Supp. 1979) as amended by
N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 352-eeee(8)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1979). Since almost all pre-war
buildings have rent controlled and rent stabilized tenants, see note 6 supra, questions have
arisen as to the effect of the different provisions of the two laws on the ability of the con-
verter to have an eviction plan declared effective. The issue presented is whether the con-
verter must obtain the consent of 35% of the rent controlled tenants as required by
section 55 of the Rent and Eviction Regulations and 35% of the "tenants in occupancy" as
provided in section YY51-6.0(c)(9)(a) of the Rent Stabilization Law, regardless of their sta-
tus. This question was raised in Ortega v. Lefkowitz, 66 Misc. 2d 438, 321 N.Y.S.2d 231
(Sup. Ct. 1971), aff'd, 38 A.D.2d 792, 328 N.Y.S.2d 1008 (1st Dep't 1972). In this case, the
building converted to cooperative ownership had both rent controlled and rent stabilized
tenants. An amendment to the plan called for the conversion to be effective upon obtaining
consent from 35% of the tenants in occupancy provided 35% of rent stabilized apartments
also consented. The court held that the plan was valid and rejected the plaintiff's argument
that 35% of the rent controlled tenants must also consent. In so doing, the court stated,
"[wihile stock of the co-operative representing ownership of the rent controlled apartments
will be offered, the rights of tenants [who do not purchase] . . . such apartments to contin-
ued possession will not be affected by the conversion." 66 Misc. 2d at 440, 321 N.Y.S.2d at
19. It is the view of Lehner & Sweet, that
the plan would have been valid if it had only called for the consents of 35 percent of
all of the tenants since the [RIent Stabilization Law refers to tenants in occupancy,
while the [Rent Control Law] refers[s] to tenants of controlled premises. This conclu-
sion is buttressed by Arnette v. Lefkowitz [77 Misc. 2d 821, 354 N.Y.S.2d 836 (Sup.
Ct. 1974)] where the court held in a stabilized building the plan would be effective
upon obtaining consents of 35 percent of the tenants in occupancy even though this
would have included less than 35 percent of the stabilized tenants.
Lehner & Sweet, supra note 6, at 35, col. 1 (footnote omitted).
266. NEW YORK, N.Y. ADMIN. CODE § YY51-6.0(c)(9)(f) (Supp. 1979).
267. Id. There is no provision in the Rent Stabilization Law stating when a new conver-
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declared effective because thirty-five percent of the tenants in occu-
pancy have agreed to purchase their apartments within the eigh-
teen month time period, a non-purchasing tenant may be removed
from his apartment by the owner of the building, by a purchaser of
the apartment or by a proprietary lessee entitled to possession of
the apartment."' There is no requirement that any of these persons
intend to occupy the apartment. 2"1 However, the right to remove a
non-purchasing tenant may not be exercised until the latest of the
following dates: one year from the date of presentation of the plan,
one year from the date on which the plan is declared effective, or
the expiration date of the lease. 0
Both ordinances seek to control the conversion trend in a number
of ways. The consent requirements of the Rent Control Law and
the Rent Stabilization Law give tenants a voice in the conversion
decision. The exact percentage of tenants required to buy is not as
important as the fact that such a provision exists. 7' Requiring ten-
ant consent is important for three reasons: 1) it curbs eviction of
tenants and displacement of tenants, 2) it restricts the ease with
which landlords can effect conversions, and 3) it gives tenants an
active role in the conversion process. The time periods within
which the converter must obtain tenant consent and within which
the converter has to wait before he can submit a new plan prevents
the converter from constantly soliciting tenants to purchase as well
as encourage the converter to offer a plan that would be acceptable
to tenants.
sion plan may be submitted to the tenants.
268. Id. § YY51-6.0(c)(9)(d) (1975).
269. This provision should be compared with the rent control provision which requires
that the purchaser who seeks possession of a converted apartment must do so for his own
personal use. N.Y.C. Rent & Eviction Rgs., supra note 233, §§ 55(a), 55(c)(2). See
note 256 supra and accompanying text.
270. NEw YORK, N.Y. ADMIN. CODE § YY51-6.0(c)(9)(d)-(e) (1975). A rent stabilized ten-
ant may be evicted before the expiration of his lease if the lease was entered into after the
offering plan was submitted to the Attorney General and 'he lease contained a provision
permitting cancellation on 90 days notice after the plan is declared effective. Id. § YY51-
6.0(c)(9)(f) (Supp. 1979).
271. A minimum of 35% consent is the figure that the New York City Council found
acceptable both to landlords and tenants. During the legislative hearings conducted respect-
ing the Goodman-Dearie Act, see note 244 supra and accompanying text, tenant spokesmen
argued that a 51% tenant consent requirement would be more equitable to tenants. N.Y.
Times, Mar. 3, 1977, at 30, col. 6. See note 251 supra and note 303 infra for a comparison
with other jurisdictions.
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2. Non-eviction Plan
A converter who wishes to convert a building pursuant to a non-
eviction plan is technically free from complying with the rigorous
provisions of the Rent Control Law and the Rent Stabilization
Law."' In recent years, however, the Attorney General"' has re-
quired that at least fifteen percent of the tenants in occupancy
agree to purchase their apartments for a non-eviction plan to be
declared effective."' Under a non-eviction conversion plan, certifi-
cates of eviction may not be issued to dispossess non-purchasing
rent controlled tenants"' and renewal leases must be provided to
rent stabilized tenants."' Non-purchasing tenants remain subject
to the Rent Control Law and the Rent Stabilization Law.
A non-eviction plan apparently presents a method of effecting a
conversion without presenting great hardship to either the con-
verter or the tenants. The converter need not comply with the pro-
visions of the Rent Control Law and the Rent Stabilization Law
and the tenant is free to purchase or to continue as a tenant."'
Problems, however, will invariably arise. The converter, as the
landlord of many of the apartments in the building, will bear a
heavy financial burden if the rents do not equal the monthly main-
tenance charges. This may tempt the landlord to harass non-pur-
chasers in order to force them to move. 5 In addition, the non-
purchasing tenant, although allowed to remain in his apartment,
may not be able to live peacefully. Often, tension builds in "hy-
brid" buildings" ' because the landlord may discriminate between
purchasers and non-purchasers in providing services and facili-
272. See notes 241-46 supra and accompanying text.
273. See note 248 supra.
274. Lehner & Sweet, supra note 6, at 36, col. 2. There is no statutory authority for this
practice. However, a provision requiring a minimum percentage of tenants to purchase
before a non-eviction plan can be effective has been considered by the New York State Leg-
islature in the past. Id.
275. N.Y.C. Rent & Eviction Regs., supra note 233, § 55(c)(3). See, e.g., De Minicis v.
148 East 83rd St., 15 N.Y.2d 432, 435, 209 N.E.2d 63, 64, 261 N.Y.S.2d 1, 3 (1965); Ortega v.
Lefkowitz, 66 Misc. 2d 438, 440, 321 N.Y.S.2d 17, 19 (Sup. Ct. 1971), affl'd, 38 A.D.2d 792,
328 N.Y.S.2d 1008 (1st Dept. 1972).
276. See NEW YORK, N.Y. ADMIN. CODE § YY51-6.0(c)(9) (1975).
277. Lehner & Sweet, supra note 6, at 35, col. 4.
278. Id.
279. The term "hybrid" buildings has been used to refer to those buildings containing
purchasers and non-purchasers. N.Y. Times, Mar. 7, 1980, at A20, col. 4.
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ties."' Finally, non-eviction plans may also weaken the tenants'
ability to bargain -and negotiate a plan more favorable to the te-
nants.28' This is because converters may feel that they need not ne-
gotiate with the tenants in a non-eviction plan because the tenants
are not being forced to purchase or move out of their apartments. 82
3. State Law
A state law protecting eligible senior citizens who refuse to
purchase their apartments has recently been enacted.211 This law
provides that no eviction proceeding may be brought against a non-
purchasing tenant who has used the apartment as his primary resi-
dence for at least two years prior to the filing date and is sixty-two
years of age or older at the time the plan is "accepted for filing."' 4
The tenant must be able to certify that his annual income does not
280. Lehner & Sweet, supra note 6, at 35, col. 4.
281. Id. Typically, tenants form associations as soon as they learn that their building is
about to be converted. The association will negotiate with the owner to purchase the build-
ing and convert it themselves, if the building owner has not sold to a developer. Tenant
associations are often able to pay more to the building owner than the developer could and
still pay less per unit by eliminating the converter's profit margin. Philadelphia Inquirer,
Sept. 24, 1979, at 4-A, col. 3. In New York City tenant associations often negotiate with the
converter for more favorable terms by threatening to withhold their consent. See notes 251 &
265 supra and accompanying text.
282. Lehner & Sweet, supra note 6, at 35, col. 4.
283. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 352-eeee (McKinney Supp. 1979). This law has already been
the subject of litigation in the case of Reiner-Kaiser Assocs. v. McConnachie, N.Y.L.J.,
Aug. 27, 1979, at 13, col. 1 (Civ. Ct. Queens County): The case involved a holdover proceed-
ing brought by a landlord to recover possession from a non-purchasing tenant of an apart-
ment which had been converted to a cooperative in September 1978. The tenant sought
protection from eviction under the new senior citizen non-eviction provision. The court re-
jected the tenant's contention that the law protected her because the conversion became
effective well before the law was enacted. Id. at col. 2. The court also rejected the landlord's
contention that the law was a violation of the equal protection clause of the United States
Constitution and New York State Constitution. The court held that this legislation "which
gives effect to the objective of protecting senior citizens from the effects of a critical housing
situation is both rational and reasonable and any discrepancies in treatment which result do
not amount to a denial of the equal protection of the laws under the Federal and State
Constitutions." Id.
284. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 352-eeee(1)(e) (McKinney Supp. 1979). Non-purchasing se-
nior citizens remain subject to the Rent Control Law or Rent Stabilization Law. Id. § 352-
eeee(2)(a). Accord, SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., CODE § 1391(c) (1979) (62 year old tenants and dis-
abled tenants are provided lifetime leases). See also Los Angeles, Cal., Ordinance 153,251
(Dec. 17, 1979) (to be codified in Los ANGELES, CAL., CODE § 47.06(B) (1979) (tenants over
age 62, handicapped and disabled tenants, and tenants with one or more children may not
be evicted unless the landlord has provided them with relocation assistance).
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exceed $30,000.1s5 Although this law restricts a converter's ability to
convert an entire building, its harshness is ameliorated by another
provision in the same act. This provision permits the converter to
deduct from the base figure for calculating the thirty-five percent
consent requirement for an eviction plan to become effective all the
eligible rent stabilized senior citizens and half of the eligible rent
controlled senior citizens who elect not to buy."'6
In addition to protecting the elderly from evictions, this new law
also provides solutions to two other problems usually associated
with conversions. The first problem is commonly known as ware-
housing; that is, keeping apartments vacant so as to reduce the
number of tenants necessary to meet the thirty-five percent con-
sent requirement. Under the anti-warehousing provision of this
law, the Attorney General must find that an excessive number of
"long-term vacancies" '287 does not exist on the date the plan is Sub-
mitted to him before he can issue a letter stating that the offering
plan has been accepted for filing. The second problem concerns
harassment of non-purchasing tenants. This new statute alleviates
this problem by requiring that all of the apartments occupied by
non-purchasing tenants be managed by the same managing agent
who manages the cooperative or condominium units in the build-
ing. 88 The managing agent must provide all required services and
facilities to non-purchasing tenants on a non-discriminatory ba-
sis." ' The Attorney General has the power to enforce this obligation
285. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 352-eeee(1)(e) (McKinney Supp. 1979). The term "annual
income" is defined in the statute to include the "combined income from all sources of all
tenants of the dwelling unit for the income tax year immediately preceding the year in which
the plan is accepted for filing by the attorney general." Id. § 352-eeee(1)(d). The term has
been interpreted to mean income after deductions of all business expenses. Otherwise, gross
revenues would have been a more appropriate statutory term. The term includes non-taxa-
ble income such as social security payments and interest on municipal bonds. Lehner, Sweet
& Dryfoos, Cooperative and Condominium Conversions: (Lehner - Flynn Law's Impact on
Protecting Senior Citizens), N.Y.L.J., Sept. 14, 1979, at 1, col. 2 [hereinafter cited as Leh-
ner, Sweet & Dryfoos].
286. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 352-eeee(6) (McKinney Supp. 1979).
287. Id. § 352-eeee(3)(a). "Long-term vacancies" are apartments not leased or occupied
for more than five months prior to the date of submission of the plan. The vacancy rate is
"excessive" if it is greater than 10% of the apartments in the building and is double the
normal average vacancy rate for the building for two years prior to the January preceding
the date of submission of the plan. Id.
288. Id. § 352-eeee(4).
289. Id. The converter must guarantee the managing agent's obligation for so long as the
converter controls the board of directors or board of managers of the cooperative or condo-
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and obtain relief against harassment of tenants through either an
order restraining such conduct or an order restraining the owner
from selling the shares allocated to the apartment or selling the
apartment itself.9 0
Whereas these laws evidence a comprehensive scheme for con-
trolling conversions in New York City, a provision regulating the
rate of conversion is conspicuously absent. The most radical provi-
sion of this kind is a moratorium on conversions under specific
emergency conditions. Such conditions are usually keyed to the
availability of vacant apartments in a city. For example, some lo-
cal governments have enacted ordinances prohibiting conversions
from taking place whenever the rental vacancy rate for that com-
munity falls below a certain level, usually three to five percent of
the community's rental apartment stock.2"' The reason for such a
provision is to insure that displaced tenants will be able to find
alternative rental housing within the same community. Such an or-
dinance may be appropriate in New York City because the rental
vacancy rate there is one percent.9 2
B. Washington, D.C.
Washington, D.C. has enacted conversion regulations which pro-
vide a more comprehensive regulatory scheme and grant greater
protection to tenants than do New York's statutes. The legal sys-
tem for regulating conversions in Washington D.C. is found in
three acts and their respective amendments. These are the Condo-
minium Act of 1976,93 the Rental Housing Act of 1977,29 and the
Cooperative Regulation Act of 1979.95 The relevant sections of each
of these acts are discussed below.
minium association. Id.
290. Id. § 352-eeee(5).
291. LONGEINI & LAUBER, supra note 22, at 9. Some cities like Palo Alto, California per-
mit an exception to this rule when 67% of the tenants consent to a conversion. "The ratio-
nale for these thresholds is that a five percent rental vacancy rate makes it difficult for low
and moderate income renters to find apartments, and a three percent rental vacancy rate
makes it difficult for all renters, regardless of income." Id. at 10.
292. N.Y. Times, Jan. 22, 1980, at 1, col. 1.
293. D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 5-1201 to -1297 (Supp. V 1978).
294. Id. §§ 45-1681 to -1699.27 (Supp. VI 1979).
295. D.C. Law 3-63, 26 D.C. Reg. 361, 1649 (1979) (eff. Sept. 28, 1979).
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1. Condominium Act of 1976
Title V of the Condominium Act of 1976, as amended, estab-
lishes a procedure for converting rental units into condominiums in
the District of Columbia."'6 Initially the permission of the mayor is
required for conversion." 7 Different criteria exist for condominium
conversion depending upon 1) whether the building is a "high rent
housing accommodation," ' 2) if the building is not a "high rent"
building, whether the city's vacancy rate for low rent buildings is
greater than three percent,2" ' or 3) regardless of the rental or va-
cancy rate, whether a majority of the tenants in the building have
agreed to the conversion 4"
Any "high rent" building may be converted. It is assumed that
tenants in a high rent building can afford either to purchase their
apartments or to pay for alternative rental housing. 1 Also, because
few low income tenants live in high rent buildings there is presum-
ably no fear of displacing this class.
The conversion of low rent buildings is keyed to the availability
of vacant low rent apartments in the District. Low rent buildings
can be converted if their vacancy rate is greater than three per-
cent. 2 This regulation insures that the District will have an ade-
quate supply of low rent housing to meet the needs of displaced
tenants and to preserve a diverse housing stock.
Finally, notwithstanding a vacancy rate of at least three percent,
a majority of the heads of households actually residing in low rent
buildings can consent in writing to a conversion.us This approach
296. D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 5-1261 to -1278, -1281 to -1297 (Supp. V 1978).
297. Id. § 5-1281(a).
298. Id. § 5-1281(b)(1)(A).
[T]he term "high rent housing accommodation" includes any housing accommoda-
tion in the District of Columbia for which the total monthly rent exceeds an amount
computed for such housing accommodations as follows: (i) multiply the number of
rental units in the following categories by the corresponding rent: (I) $228.50 for one-
bedroom rental units; (II) $287 for two bedroom rental units; (III) $403 for three or
more bedroom rental units; (IV) $174 for efficiency rental units; and (ii) total the
results obtained in phase (i).
Id. § 5-1281(b)(1)(b) (Supp. VI 1979).
299. Id. § 5-1281(b)(1)(B) (Supp. V 1978). The method of computing the rental vacancy
rate is contained in id. § 5-1282.
300. Id. § 5-1281(b)(2).
301. See notes 16-20 supra and accompanying text.
302. D.C. CODE ANN. § 5-1281(b)(1)(B) (Supp. V 1978).
303. Id. § 5-1281(b)(2).
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assumes that if more than half of the tenants approve the conver-
sion, tenants will either buy their apartments or expect to find al-
ternative housing in the neighborhood. Therefore, little displace-
ment will occur.
Once a building is found eligible to convert, a converter must file
a Certificate of Registration and make a public offering state-
ment."o' Protective provisions which allow tenants time to decide
whether to purchase their apartments, become operative upon re-
gistration of the offering statement. The converter must give an of-
ficial notice to tenants, not more than ten days after the date of
application for registration, giving them 120 days notice of the con-
version before they can be served with a notice to vacate at the end
of their lease terms."5 Tenants have an exclusive right to contract
for the purchase of the apartment in which they live during the
first sixty days of this 120 day period.3" The contract to purchase
must be on terms and conditions at least as favorable to the te-
nants as those being offered by the converter to the general
public.307
A tenant who fails to exercise the right to purchase must vacate
the apartment at the end of the lease term.3" Unlike New York
City, there is no such thing as a "non-eviction plan."' The harsh-
ness of eviction is softened somewhat by the fact that an eligible
tenant who is forced to vacate is entitled to receive housing assis-
tance.3 ° Eligible tenants can receive housing assistance for up to
five years3l' in an amount equal to the difference between twenty-
five percent of their average net monthly income and the amount of
monthly rent to be paid in the first full month in the new apart-
ment.' Housing assistance is paid by the converter for the first
304. Id. § 5-1263.
305. Id. 5-1268(b)(1).
306. Id. § 5-1268(b)(2).
307. Id.
308. Id. § 5-1268(b)(3).
309. See note 241 supra and accompanying text.
310. D.C. CODE ANN. § 5-1291 (Supp. V 1978). To be eligible for housing assistance
a tenant must have lived in the apartment for at least one year prior to the first day of the
month in which the registration statement was filed, must be displaced as a result of the
conversion and must relocate in the District of Columbia. Id. § 5-1291(a)(1)-(4). Provisions
respecting the computation of housing assistance payments are found at id. § 5-1292.
311. Id. § 5-1291(a)(4).
312. Id. § 5-1292.
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two years after relocation and by the District for the next three
years."' In addition to housing assistance payments, the District
requires that the converter pay relocation compensation to eligible
tenants."4 The amount of compensation is presently $125 per room
but may be subject to adjustment in the future." 5
2. Rental Housing Act of 1977
Title VI of this Act regulates, inter alia, the sale of rental hous-
ing accommodations by requiring that a landlord, contemplating a
sale of his building, first offer it for sale to the tenants." ' In the
case of a housing accommodation comprised of a single rental unit,
the landlord must make a written offer to sell the housing ac-
commodation to the tenant before he may sell it to another pur-
chaser."7 The tenant is given at least forty-five days in which to
contract with the landlord for the purchase of the housing ac-
commodation on mutually agreeable terms." ' Thereafter, the tenant
also has the right of first refusal for fifteen days after the landlord
has received a written offer from a prospective purchaser."' If the
housing accommodation is not sold during the six months immedi-
ately following the original offer to the tenant, the landlord shall
re-offer it to the tenant in the same manner as the first offer was
made."' A landlord shall not require the tenant to pay more than a
five percent deposit of the purchase price nor may he demand a
closing date less than sixty days from the signing of the contract.2"'
313. Id. § 5-1291(a)(4). The converter's payments must be in one lump sum whereas the
District's payments may be monthly or in one lump sum. Id.
314. Id. § 5-1291(b).
315. Id. § 5-1293(a)(1). See notes 101-02 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of
the inadequacy of such financial assistance. See also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-61:11 (West
Supp. 1979)(hardship relocation compensation in the form of waiver of payment of 5 months
rent); ALAMEDA, CAL., CODE § 11-14D6(d) (1977) (moving expenses up to $150 plus $10 per
room); Los Angeles, Cal., Ordinance 153,251 (Dec. 17, 1979) (to be codified in Los ANGELES,
CAL., CODE § 47.06(D)(1)(a)(4) (1979)) ($2500 relocation assistance paid to eligible tenants);
SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., CODE § 1392(a) (1979) (maximum of $1000 paid for moving expenses);
Seattle, Wash., Ordinance 107707, §§ 3, 9 (Oct. 4, 1978) (relocation assistance of $350.00 per
unit paid to non-purchasing tenants).
316. D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 45-1699.8 to -1699.9 (Supp. VI 1979).
317. Id. § 45-1699.8(a).
318. Id.
319. Id. § 45-1699.8(b).
320. Id. § 45-1699.8(c).
321. This provision is contained in Transmittal #2 of the Legislative Updating Service for
Rent Control Laws (Nov. 27, 1979) (to be codified in D.C. CODE ANN. § 45-1699.8(d)).
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A landlord of a building containing two to four apartments must
give the tenants, either jointly or severally, an opportunity to
purchase the building at a price which represents a bona fide offer
of sale by giving them written notice containing the asking price for
the building and a statement of the tenants' rights."' The tenants
are then given a ninety day period in which to negotiate a mutually
agreeable contract with the landlord.3 ' If, at the end of this period,
an agreement has not been reached among the tenants, an addi-
tional fifteen days is given to any one of the tenants to contract for
the purchase of the building.3 ' Again, the landlord may not require
more than a five percent deposit of the purchase price nor may he
demand a closing date less than sixty days from the signing of the
contract.
323
In the case of a building containing more than four units, the Act
requires that there be a tenants' organization formed with the legal
capacity to hold real estate .1 2 The tenants are given thirty days to
form such an organization. Ninety days are given for the organiza-
tion to contract to purchase the building from the landlord on mu-
tually agreeable terms. The landlord may not require more than a
five percent deposit of the purchase price nor demand a closing
date less than one hundred twenty days from the signing of the
contract. The landlord must refund the deposit in the event of a
good-faith failure of the tenants' organization to perform under the
contract. 27
This Act demonstrates a desire by the District of Columbia
Council for tenants to have equity ownership in their apartments
by requiring that tenants be given an opportunity to purchase their
apartment buildings from the landlord. As a result they obtain the
same benefits of equity ownership as tenants who purchase in a
conversion. The concomitant community benefits will follow. 32
322. D.C. CODE ANN. § 1699.9(a) (Supp. VI 1979).
323. Id.
324. Id.
325. This provision is contained in Transmittal #2 of the Legislative Updating Service of
Rent Control Law (Nov. 27, 1979) (to be codified in D.C. CODE ANN. 45-1699.9(a)).
326. D.C. CODE ANN. § 45-1699.9(b) (Supp. VI 1979).
327. This provision is contained in Transmittal #3 of the Legislative Updating Service for
Rent Control Laws (Jan. 1, 1980) (to be codified in D.C. CODE ANN. § 45-1699.9(b)).
328. See notes 21-30 supra and accompanying text.
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3. Cooperative Regulation Act of 1979
This Act regulates the conversion of rental apartments to cooper-
atives. Cooperative conversions are prohibited329 except where: 1)
less than fifty percent of the apartments in the building are occu-
pied,330 2) where fifty percent or more of the apartments are occu-
pied, the majority of the heads of these households consent in writ-
ing to the conversion,3 ' or 3) where the building is a high rent
accommodation. 32 Where one of these three situations exists, the
mayor may grant an exemption"' after notifying the tenants and
giving them an opportunity to be heard.33' The owner may not ter-
minate any tenancies or require tenants to vacate unless an exemp-
tion is granted.O If an exemption is granted, the landlord must
give the tenants at least 120 days notice of the conversion."' The
landlord must make each tenant a bona fide offer of sale of the
apartment in which the tenant resides.33 The tenant is then given
sixty days in which to contract with the landlord for the purchase
of the apartment on mutually agreeable terms.3 8 The landlord may
not serve a tenant with a notice to vacate until ninety days after
the tenant received the notice of conversion and prior to the expira-
tion of the sixty day negotiating period unless the tenant has re-
jected the landlord's offer for sale of the apartment.3'
This Act also requires housing assistance and relocation compen-
sation with essentially the same provisions as found in the Condo-
minium Act of 1976.340
C. Local California Ordinances
The San Francisco conversion ordinance addresses the problem
of displacement of low and moderate income tenants by mandating
that a converter offer the tenants their apartments at affordable
329. D.C. Act 3-19 § 3, 26 D.C. Reg. 361 (1979).
330. Id. § 4(a)(1).
331. Id. § 4(a)(2).
332. Id. § 4(a)(3).
333. Id. § 4(a)(4)(b).
334. Id.
335. Id. § 4(a)(5).
336. D.C. CODE ANN. § 45-1699.10(a) (Supp. VI 1979).
337. Id.
338. Id.
339. Id.
340. See notes 310-15 supra and accompanying text.
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prices."' In a conversion of five or more units, the converter must
retain ten percent of the apartments for rental or make available
ten percent of the apartments for purchase by low and moderate
income households.3 14 Apartments made available for purchase
must be offered at prices that do not exceed two and a half times
the annual median income of low or moderate income families in
the area.u s To maintain these apartments for low or moderate in-
come families, the ordinance provides that any low or moderate in-
come purchaser, when he chooses to sell, must grant a right of first
refusal to the city to purchase the apartment for a sum equal to the
original purchase price, the costs of any improvements made
therein, plus any market appreciation. "' The city, in turn, must
convey the unit to other qualified low or moderate income purchas-
ers. 45 As an alternative to offering ten percent of the apartments to
low or moderate income households at reduced prices, the con-
verter may agree with the city to construct the same number of
units for low and moderate income occupancy"' or pay into a
Housing Development Fund an amount equal to ten percent of the
difference between the market prices of these apartments and their
selling prices to moderate income tenants."4 7 The Fund is used to
provide money to reduce the cost of construction of low and moder-
ate income housing and to make homeownership possible for low
and moderte income families by providing them with financial as-
sistance towards the down payment.3"' To curb the rate of conver-
sions the San Francisco ordinance permits the conversion of only
341. SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., CODE § 1385 (1979) (the price of the apartments shall be no
greater than 2.5 times the highest income level for low and moderate income households).
342. Id. § 1341(b).
343. Id. § 1341(c).
344. Id.
345. Id.
346. Id. § 1341(f).
347. Id. § 1341(g).
[Tihe [converter] shall pay to the City and County of San Francisco an amount equal
to ten percent (10%) of the difference between the aggregate total of the proposed
market rate sale prices, as indicated on the price list supplied with the application
packet, and the aggregate total of the sales price if the units were to be sold at moder-
ate income sales prices . . . . This payment shall be made within two years of the
recordation of the Final Map.
Id.
348. Id. § 1343(1).
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1000 rental units per calendar year."'
Two conversion ordinances in California remedy the displace-
ment problem by shifting the burden of finding a new residence
from the non-purchasing tenant to the converter. In Alameda, Cali-
fornia, a converter who controls other rental units must offer to
rent them to non-purchasing tenants.3 50 In Los Angeles, in addition
to paying a relocation fee of $2500 to "qualified tenants,"35 a con-
verter must make available to each qualified tenant a current list
of vacant and available comparable rental units within a one and
one-half mile radius of the building being converted.3 52 The con-
verter must also actively assist non-purchasing tenants in their
search for new housing. 353 Another provision of the Los Angeles or-
dinance attempts to solve the problem of depletion of the rental
housing stock by requiring that, as a condition to obtaining ap-
proval of the conversion, a converter pay to the city a "Rental
Housing Production Fee" of $500 for each converted unit.3 4 These
fees are held in an account and used exclusively for the develop-
ment of low and moderate income rental housing in Los Angeles, 5
V. Conclusion
Cities across the United States are experiencing a Vast increase
in the number of conversions of rental apartments to ownership
status. The resulting displacement of non-purchasing tenants and
depletion of the existing rental housing supply has prompted many
cities to enact conversion moratoriums which give lawmakers time
to study the problem and enact permanent protective legislation.
Although a conversion moratorium would probably withstand four-
teenth amendment challenges under the United States -Constitu-
tion, it is possible that some local moratoriums would be struck
349. Id. § 1396.
350. ALAMEDA, CAL., CODE § 11-14D6(c) (1977).
351. A qualified tenant is either over age 62, handicapped, disabled or the parent or
guardian of one or more children. The term qualified tenant does not include any tenant who
is offered relocation assistance or who intends to purchase a unit in the conversion. Los
Angeles, Cal., Ordinance 153, 251 (Dec. 17, 1979) (to be codified in Los ANGELES, CAL., CODE
§ 47.06 (B)).
352. Id. § 47.06 (D)(1)(a)(1).
353. The converter may have to either drive qualified tenants to the replacement unit or
hire an ambulance to take disabled tenants. Id.
354. Los Angeles, Cal., Ordinance 153, 024 (Oct. 4, 1979).
355. Id.
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down on state constitutional grounds. In any case, conversion
moratoriums are only useful as temporary measures and must be
followed by permanent protective legislation.
With the exception of federal tax schemes that encourage the op-
eration of rental apartment buildings, federal legislation in this
area is inappropriate because it cannot accommodate the unique
circumstances that exist among United States cities. A remaining
issue is whether conversion regulation should emanate from state
legislatures or from local governments. Local legislation is proper
to the extent that a city's housing market does not affect neigh-
boring areas. However, state regulation is preferable where local
legislation would affect nearby communities. Regardless of whether
the regulatory scheme is enacted at the state or local level, its
purpose should be to encourage conversions and to minimize dis-
placement and rental housing depletion.
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